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Inequality has been rising since China’s economic reform. This thesis analyzes inequality in terms of 
urban-rural income differences that caused by the combination work of global forces and national 
policies. In particular, China’s adoption of export-oriented growth based explicitly on wage 
competitiveness. This cannot be fully explained by its controlled exchange rate policies and even huge 
surplus of rural labor. It is a consequence of the government’s fiscal, financial, and agricultural policies 
that transferred financial and human resources from its rural-agricultural sector to the urban-industrial 
sector. As rural population account for the majority of the entire population, a drop of wage share for 
the rural population lead to falling private consumption and aggregate demand. A weak domestic 
market automatically made China overly dependent on foreign demand thus exposed China to the 
unstable situations of international market. The paper concludes that the government should dedicate 
efforts to build a strong domestic market by adopting a more inward economic strategy that focuses 
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Balance Growth Distribution to Achieve Better Social Development: A Reflection on 
China’s Urban Centered Export-Oriented Industrialization Strategy 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
China has managed an average growth rate of 10% since it began economic reform and openness 
in 1978. It adopted a reform paradigm that depends on export to boost growth. In free markets where 
the movement of labor is unrestricted and wages are determined competitively, we would expect 
migration to tend to equalize the returns to labor among rural areas and between rural and urban 
areas. In China, however, this did not occur. There is a very considerable difference between rural and 
urban incomes. This is due to the Chinese urban-centered development policy, which can be 
characterized as “urban bias” (Lipton, 1977). Incomes in urban areas are higher. Public spending are 
disproportionately allocated to improve urban infrastructure and services. Moreover, it is argued that 
urban residents possess disproportionate political power and influence that further biased 
government policies aiding to their interest. Therefore, there is a continuing increase of urban-rural 
income gap. Where an urban-rural income gap exists and cannot be closed, it acts as a magnet to 
attract migrants from rural areas. Thus China was able to capture the gains of its comparative 
advantage in abundant labor supply. Cheap labor price became the principal attraction of FDI which 
further aided to export-oriented industrialization. And the accession to the WTO in 2001 has allowed 
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China to play this advantage to the full.  
 Agricultural productions is no longer funding the national economic growth and hence no longer 
the focus of policy. On top of diminishing rural investment, the government, by keeping the price of 
agriculture products low, took a fraction of rural income to fuel the urban industrialization (Lu & Zhu, 
2015). 
China’s adoption of export-oriented growth depends explicitly on wage competitiveness. This 
cannot be fully explained by its controlled exchange rate policies and even huge surplus of rural labor. 
It is a consequence of the government’s fiscal, financial, and agricultural policies that biased against 
the rural area and transferred financial and human resources from its rural-agricultural sector to the 
urban-industrial sector (Lim, 2014). 
Then what will be most likely development outcome if China continues to carry on its urban 
centered, export-oriented industrialization strategy? 
While sustaining high growth rates, the export-led growth has also brought serious structural 
imbalances to China. The most noticeable one is the sharply declined share of wage, especially the low 
share of rural wage that created a sharp decline of domestic consumption power. The export oriented 
industrialization is highly relied on the global market’s unsustainable demand and financing patterns. 
If there are crises like the 2008 world economy crash and the accompanying Great Recession, a global 
demand shortness will be an overarching structural condition. For a developing country like China, 
whose rapid export growth was cut abruptly since its high dependency on consumer demand in the 
developed countries, mainly the United States, it rendered the Chinese economy to confront a 
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troubling outlook of significant demand shortage (Palley T. I., 2011). Yet it is impossible to direct these 
products surplus to the domestic market due to the low domestic demand and consumer purchase 
power. 
The low level of consumption is due to the growing rural-urban income inequalities that exclude 
the majority of population from the benefits of rapid growth (Cao & Zhang, 2015). Further, a large part 
of the Chinese fiscal stimulus has been directed at creating infrastructure capacities that further aid to 
export instead of pushing up household consumption or improve domestic welfare. 
During the process of China’s high-speed urban centered export-oriented industrialization, rural 
peasants and migrant workers have borne the major costs. Peasants in China are already under great 
disadvantage from the outset because they possess a position at the bottom of the social hierarchy 
and having limited financial as well as social capital, Further they are mainly characterized as unskilled, 
undertrained and labelled as underclass in the city. This made them staying in the labor-intensive, low-
paid jobs. It is hard for them to break through the invisible wall to establish real social networks with 
the urbanites as well as elevate their social status upward. 
China is at a turning point of its 40 years of reform and economic opening. The global financial 
crisis exposed its vulnerability of dependency on global markets and export. Domestically, it is also 
facing with many structural problems that mainly attributed to the adoption of urban centered export-
oriented policy. Continuing this pattern is certainly unsustainable. 
China’s urban centered, export-oriented industrialization strategy has created structural problems 
that have to be addressed for more balanced growth. The most significant problems include slow 
4 
 
growth of residential income and domestic consumption, and heavy reliance on global market 
investment. Government should gradually cut the economy’s dependence on export demand of the 
international market by focusing on boosting domestic consumption power through adjusting the 
current income distribution pattern to benefit the poorer and disadvantaged. This indicates the 
necessity to facilitate a new paradigm of domestic demand-led growth that characterized by focusing 
on building a healthier rural economic environment for the rural residence. Government and private 
reinvestment should focus on rural development while avoiding over investment on the export sector. 
Export sector should upgrade its structure and move up the value-added chain to maintain its 
competitiveness in the international market thus allow wage of labor to raise. Strong social safety nets 







Chapter 2. Literature Review: China’s Urban Centered Export-oriented Growth 
2.1. Reform background  
2.1.1. Pre-reform era: The failure to adopt the Soviet model 
The People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949. China’s economy was greatly 
interrupted by an eight-year battle against Japanese invaders as well as four years civil war between 
the Communist and Kuomintang forces. Its growth potential was devastated by the war and inflation. 
The leadership under Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other revolutionary veterans prepared the ground 
for China to embark on an intensive program of industrial growth and socialization. The new regime 
adopted the Soviet experience and went on to create an economic system largely modeled after it. 
The Chinese system was based on extensive state ownership in the modern sector, large collective 
units in agriculture, centralized economic planning, central control over prices, and material balance 
plans that issued specific directives governing the allocation of major inputs, products, and financial 
flows. This period, which was officially designated the “transition to socialism” corresponded to China’s 
First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). 
2.1.1.1. 1953-1957: The Transition to Socialism 
Extensive State Ownership 
Initially, after the Communist party had taken charge and the country proclaimed its 
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independence in 1949, the Soviet Union became its closest ally. Soviet design, equipment, experts and 
skilled labor were set out to help industrialize and modernize the PRC. They worked to help establish 
new institutions that organized around annual and five-year plans. China began adopting the Soviet 
socialist system with a centrally planned economy. The leaders assumed this would help China from 
the aftermath of World War II and the civil war, and make it a rich and strong country. 
As in the USSR, the key plan objective was to raise domestic savings, particularly by extracting 
resources from the rural sector, and to channel these funds toward industrial growth, particularly 
concentrating on heavy industry and capital-intensive technology. Soviet planners helped their Chinese 
counterparts formulate the plan. Large numbers of Soviet engineers, technicians, and scientists 
assisted in developing and installing new heavy industrial facilities, including many entire plants and 
pieces of equipment purchased from the Soviet Union (Federal Research Division, 2012a). 
Government control over industry was increased during this period by applying financial pressures 
and inducements to convince owners of private, modern firms to sell them to the state or convert 
them into joint public-private enterprises under state control. By 1956 approximately 67.5 percent of 
all modern industrial enterprises were state owned and 32.5 percent were under joint public-private 
ownership. No privately owned firms remained. During the same period, the handicraft industries 
were organized into cooperatives, which accounted for 91.7 percent of all handicraft workers by 1956 
(Mongabay, 1987a). 
Large Collective in Agriculture 
In the early 1950s, China had many pressing needs. They were, for example, food for a growing 
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population, domestic capital for investment, and the purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital 
equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, the government began to collectivize 
agriculture (Federal Research Division, 2012a). 
The ideology behind collecting agriculture is to improve efficiency of farming and increase 
government access to agricultural products. From the loosely structured, tiny mutual aid teams, 
villages were to advance first to the lower-stage Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives, in which families 
still received some income on the basis of the amount of land they contributed, and eventually to 
Advanced Cooperatives, or collectives. In the Advanced Producers’ Cooperatives, income shares were 
based only on the amount of labor contributed. In addition, each family was allowed to retain a small 
piece of land on which to grow vegetables, fruit, and livestock for their own use. The collectivization 
process began slowly but accelerated in 1955 and 1956. Preliminary collectivization was 90 percent 
completed by the end of 1956. In 1957, about 93.5 percent of all farm households had joined Advanced 
Producers’ Cooperatives (Dang, 2009) (Federal Research Division, 2012a). 
In order to further break off the boundaries of existing communities, the scope of Producers’ 
Cooperatives was expanded. Until the end of 1958, around 740,000 Producers’ Cooperatives were 
reorganized into more than 20,000 People’s Communes. People’s Communes were created by 
combining some 20 or 30 advanced Producers’ Cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, 
although membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000 in some cases (Dang, 2009). 
Everything was shared in the commune. Private kitchens became redundant and were replaced by 
communal dining. Everything in the private kitchen, such as tables, chairs, cooking utensils and pans 
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all contributed to the commune’s kitchen. All commune members could eat for free there. Everything 
originally owned by the households, such as private animals, stored grains and other food items were 
also contributed to the commune. They were put to different uses as assigned by the commune. All 
farming activities were to be centrally assigned by cadres every morning. Everybody in the commune 
was assigned jobs and tasks by their commune leaders (Federal Research Division, 2012a). 
During the transition to socialism, China’s another important measurement sought to central 
control of food prices, which was called “centralized purchase and sale” (Dang, 2009), especially on 
grain. As its name suggested, there are only unity purchase and sales of food national wide. The State 
established a national monopoly of food circulation by organizing the food supply and demand channel. 
This “centralized purchase and sale” system later developed into including food, oil, cotton and other 
agricultural products. 
Centralized Economic Planning 
A massive socialist industrial complex was set forth through direct government control. The 
economy and nearly every aspect of social functioning operated "according to plans" (Brown, 2012) 
(Mongabay, 1987a) (Naughton, 2007). Market mechanisms do not apply. Assigned production targets 
were issued to firms and famers. Resources and goods are directly allocated among different producers. 
Prices lost their meanings and could not signal directions of resource allocation in the economy any 
more. Finances were used to audit and monitor performance rather than drive investment decisions. 
While there were little market for farm products, there was no market for grain (Naughton, 2007). 
There was almost no market-driven labor mobility. Migration and urbanization halted. 
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People’s incentive to produce and work was low due to the nation’s “centralized purchase and 
sale” on major agriculture products.1 Communes exercised management and control over all rural 
resources such as labor and land. Everyone was allocated an equal amount of salary, supplies, food etc. 
every month, regardless of how hard they had been working. 
In order to satisfy the overambitious Chinese industrialization strategy, prices, especially the 
prices of agriculture products, were kept artificially low. Taking grain production for example, farmers 
could only sell grains to the commune at a set price and keep only a rationed amount of grain to satisfy 
household needs. Private storage of agriculture products was not allowed. A fraction of rural income 
was thus expropriated in support of developing heavy industry. The government directed resources to 
capital-intensive factories producing metals, machinery and chemicals, but neglected labor-intensive 
sectors suitable to China's vast population. Because industrial investment was not only capital-
intensive but also technologically demanding, the economic return was often low, in the sense that 
capital was tied up for a comparatively long period of time without producing output (Mongabay, 
1987a) (Naughton, 2007). 
Demand increased to the point where supply could not keep up, leading to shortages in the price-
controlled products. This was one of the main reasons why China’s agricultural development stagnated, 
coursing a serious shortage of agricultural products. Amplified by the bad weather in 1958, 1959 and 
1960, famine became widespread. 
                                                             
1 Though started with agriculture products’ price control, this control later moved on to products relate to almost all 
aspects of life. For e.g. cloth, metal ware etc. (Federal Research Division, 2012a). 
10 
 
2.1.1.2. 1958-1976: Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution 
Judging from the fast formation of collectivism during the First Five-Year Plan, people anticipate 
of that “communism would soon be realized”. The leadership was eager to “really show [the world] 
the superiority of socialism with higher initiatives and labor productivity” and “have great confidence 
on transforming [China] from socialism to communism in 10 years” (Dang, 2009).2 The leadership 
adopted an approach that relied on spontaneous heroic efforts of the entire population to produce a 
dramatic “great leap” in production for all sectors of the economy at once (Federal Research Division, 
2012b). This was another representation of the government’s great eagerness to reach fast economic 
success. 
In order to “leap” to a higher stage of productivity, the agriculture sector underwent some further 
reorganization. Moreover, surplus rural labor also was to be employed to support the industrial sector 
by setting up thousands of small-scale, low-technology, “backyard” industrial projects in farm units, 
which would produce machinery required for agricultural development and components for urban 
industries (Federal Research Division, 2012b). 
People’s Communes reached their peak during that era. The communes acquired all ownership 
rights over the productive assets of their subordinate units and took over most of the planning and 
decision making for farm activities. It is believed, ideally, that communes were to improve efficiency 
of productivity by moving farm families into dormitories, feeding them in communal kitchens and 
                                                             
2 According to the Marxist’s Theory of Productive Forces (sometimes referred to as Productive Force Determinism), 
technology and productivity advancement should be given primary emphasis in order to achieve real socialism and 
eventually communism. Thus it is not difficult to see the reason of Chinese leadership’s eagerness on improving 
productivity (Government of China, 2013). 
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moving whole teams of laborers from task to task (Federal Research Division, 2012b). In practice, this 
ideal was never carried out. This is because that everyone is less incentive to produce more since they 
receive equal payment regardless whether they work hard or not. Further, leaders of communes tend 
to boast unrealistic production goals in favor of their own political future or promotion. For example, 
in a Chinese commune, a paddy field of one Chinese acreage3 can normally yield approximately 800 
pounds per harvest season; and a High-yield experimental test field of paddy can produce around 2000 
pounds per Chinese acreage (Lu H. , 1990). In order to compete, standards of yield were set higher and 
higher between communes. Some said they could produce 10,000 pounds per Chinese acreage, some 
said 20,000 pounds, until some claimed a production of 50,000 pounds! In order to achieve these 
overstated goals, an incredible amount of fertilizers were poured into the fields in hope of faster and 
greater production, which never happened. Seedling was too dense, and many crops rotted because 
of a lack of air and high temperature. Another example, commune members were also motivated to 
“[produce] eight million pounds of steel in three weeks…to fly our ‘satellite’ in no time…” (Lu H. , 1990). 
However, after three weeks, only a couple of pounds sintered steel had been made from pot and pans. 
The Great Leap Forward ended badly and had caused many serious economic consequences such 
like shortages of food and raw materials for industry, overproduction of poor-quality goods, 
deterioration of industrial plants through mismanagement, and exhaustion of the peasantry and of 
the intellectuals, etc. Agriculture became hardly sustainable from the resource and work forces drain 
(Federal Research Division, 2012b). This was another reason, other than “central control over price”, 
                                                             
3 One acreage approximately equals to 6.07 Chinese acreage. 
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that leads to the China's great famine from 1958 to 1961. 
On top of false directions on development strategies, political struggles within the Communist 
Party also contributed greatly to China’s economic stagnation and even recession. Mao was criticized 
in the party conferences for the failure of the Great Leap Forward. He resigned from the position of 
State Chairman in 1959, although he did retain his position as Chairman of the Communist Party. Liu 
Shaoqi became the new PRC Chairman and reformist Deng Xiaoping became CCP General Secretary. 
They assumed power of policy making and decided to bring the economy back to recovery. Obviously 
the communes were not only unable to successfully carry out all the managerial and administrative 
functions that were assigned to them, but also failed to effectively raise productivity. In order to 
address the problem of lack of material incentives to the production brigades and teams under the 
communes’ organization, efforts were focused on modify the administration of the communes in 1959 
(Federal Research Division, 2012b). 
Yet these efforts were cut abruptly by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, or simply the 
Cultural Revolution, which was set in motion by Mao in 1966 and lasted until his death in 1976. It was 
an attempt of Mao to regain political power and reestablish authority within the party and country. He 
believed that the party and the country in general need to be “purified” from the creeping “capitalist” 
and antisocialist tendencies (Mongabay, 1987b). He felt that the material incentives that had been 
restored to the peasants and others were corrupting in nature and counterrevolutionary (Federal 
Research Division, 2012c). He then brought up the point that efforts should be made to create a 
classless society: no-one was better than anyone else and all working for the good of China.  
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The main theme of the movement was the restoration of revolutionary fervor amongst party 
members and the general public. Pupils in schools and colleges were urged to return to the basic 
principles of the revolutionary movement. Chinese youths were also encouraged to openly criticize 
the liberals in the Chinese Communist Party.4 Mao believed that the progress China had made since 
1949 had led to a privileged class developing such as engineers, scientists, factory managers etc. Mao 
also believed that these people were acquiring too much power and had a potential tendency of 
“following the capitalism path”. (Mongabay, 1987b) 
Red Guards (groups of youths who banded themselves together) encouraged all the youth in 
China to criticize those who were “untrustworthy with regards to the direction of China’s development” 
(Mongabay, 1987b). No one was safe from criticism especially those who were categorized as the 
privileged class. Anyone who dared to make comments against these criticisms were deemed 
counterrevolutionary thus considered an enemy of the party and the people and were either put out 
of job or under public condemn. The revolutionary enthusiasm set off by the Cultural Revolution 
pushed China into social turmoil. The modern sector of the economy was affected the most, and cities 
suffered more upheaval than the rural areas. Production was greatly interrupted because the political 
activities of workers in the mines and factories. Output at many factories suffered from shortages of 
raw materials and other supplies. Another cause of production shortage was that the management 
power of factories were placed in the hands of the Revolutionary Committees whose member 
                                                             
4 Two major representatives of liberals in the CCP was Liu Shaoqi (the new PRC Chairman) and Deng Xiaoping (CCP 
General Secretary); who, the former one end up been expelled from CCP and the later one was put out of power until 
the end of the culture revolution. 
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consisted of representatives from the CCP, the workers, and the People’s Liberation Army. The 
committee members usually had little knowledge of management. In addition, nearly all engineers, 
managers, scientists, technicians, and other professional personnel were criticized for not being 
politically corrected thus were sent to the countryside to “participate in labor (for personal reform)”, 
or even jailed, all of which resulted in their skills and knowledge being lost to the enterprise. The effect 
was a 14 percent decline in industrial production in 1967, and another 5 percent decline in 1968 
(Mongabay, 1987b). Schools and colleges were closed and groups of Red Guards fought other groups 
of Red Guards as each separate unit believed that it knew best how China should proceed. In some 
areas the activities of the Red Guards got out of hand. They turned their anger on foreigners and 
foreign embassies got attacked. For example, there is the incident that British Embassy was burned 
down completely (Federal Research Division, 2012c). 
Comparing to the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution was mainly a political upheaval and 
did not have major changes in official economic policies or the basic economic model. Even so, from 
the previous description, it is not hard to see the Cultural Revolution had a far-reaching influence 
throughout the society and economy.  
2.1.2. China in reform 
2.1.2.1. Facing problems 
By the 1970s China had reached an economic stage that was almost unable to sustain any longer. 
The Chinese model of self-reliance and communism, once was hold by both the Chinese and many 
from abroad as a superior model of development for the Third World, offered diminishing returns to 
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the Chinese people. A high psychological price had been paid by the self-destructive isolation during 
the Cultural Revolution. It also offered diminishing incentives for the Chinese population to work 
harder indefinitely for the sake of far-off rewards (Gittings, 2005). 
By the end of 1970s, China’s economy suffered from many drawbacks that some inevitably for a 
planned socialist economy and some uniquely Chinese. For example, incomes rose much slower than 
GDP, hardly at all in the rural areas. National incomes were used for investment in continuing 
industrialization rather than passed back to its people to stimulate consumption (Gittings, 2005). The 
agriculture sector and peasants, although claimed to receive priority by policy, continued to suffer 
from no investments input. On the contrary, incomes in urban areas were twice as high as those in the 
countryside which made inequalities between rich and poor areas persisted. The hard control over 
culture and public opinions by the Party also discouraged innovation and experiment (Gittings, 2005).  
2.1.2.2. 1978: Reform and opening 
The unsuccessful attempts in order to achieve socialism and the disastrous Great Leap Forward 
and the Cultural Revolution led to doubts about socialism as a development strategy and to the 
growing belief that the market could be a superior instrument of development. 
Deng Xiaoping regarined power and announced the start of political, economic, social, and 
cultural reforms at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central 
Committee in December 1978. This session is considered a major turning point in modern Chinese 
political and economic history. Deng Xiaoping (1993) pointed out that “The essence of socialism is the 
liberalization and development of productive forces, the elimination of exploitation and polarization 
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between rich and poor, and the eventually a common prosperity for all.” Thus, economic development 
was set as the top priority. 
The Four Modernizations5 officially replaced the classic party line calling for prolonged class 
struggle. Economics, instead of politics, became top priority in future development. Thus success or 
failure of policies and individual leadership will be measured by the realization of economic goals. The 
central policies of the reform program were introduced during the Third Plenary Session. The strategy 
slogan was “Internally reform; externally open up”.6 Deng Xiaoping suggested that practical measures 
should be taken step by step to realize economic recovery and strengthening. The reform program 
essentially stressed economic self-reliance and called for an expansion of the research and education 
system and for exchanges of students and “foreign experts” from developed countries. Foreign trade 
was to be increased by opening up markets, especially the purchase of machinery from Japan and the 
West. By participating in such export-oriented growth, it was believed that China would be able to 
speed up its economic development through foreign investment, a more open market, access to 
advanced technologies, and management experience. 
The plenary session also discussed agricultural issues. Agriculture was the foundation of the 
national economy in needed of great policy attention. In order to improve the living standards of 
people across the country, it was important to accelerate the development of agricultural production. 
The plenary session presented a series of policy measures regarding the current development of 
                                                             
5 The Four Modernizations were in the fields of: Agriculture, Industry, National Defense, and Science and Technology. 
The Four Modernizations were designed to make China a great economic power by the early 21st century. 
6 As in Chinese written: 对内改革,对外开放. (Deng, 1993) 
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agriculture and peasantry. New agricultural policies, which intended to loosen political restrictions on 
peasants and allow them to produce more on their own initiative, were approved (Government of 
China, 2013). By 1989, agriculture has been effectively privatized and the profit motive became 
accepted as the dominant force throughout the economy. 
2.1.3. Why “let some people get rich first": The validity of urban centered export-led industrialization 
strategy in China and the theoretical support for the Chinese reform 
China started the economic reform as early as the late 1970s and early 1980s. It began with the 
coming of foreign businesses and governments. China needed capital, technology, manufacturing 
expertise, management knowhow, and overseas markets for its products. It also needed to generate 
sufficient surplus value to finance the modernization of the Chinese economy. The policy at that time 
mainly consisted of opening trade to the outside world, attracting foreign investment, instituting the 
contract responsibilities system in agriculture, by which farmers could sell their surplus crops and place 
them on the market. 
Production possibilities and costs were again determined by markets hence the price system was 
reinstated. Government reduced its intervention in the market. An “open door” (Deng, 1993) policy 
was introduced by which China began to allow international trade and foreign direct investment. 
Relatively, China, along with its immense labor and huge market, set forth to play a key role in global 
competition. These initiatives immediately increased the standard of living for most of the Chinese 
population and generated support for further reforms.  
By the end of the 1980s China had almost solved its food shortage problems. Aiming at creating 
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market institutions and converting the economy from an administratively driven command economy 
to a price driven market economy, economic reforms that time mainly focused on boosting export-
oriented industries. Around the 1990, six special economic zones along the coast (SEZs) were 
established, for example, the famous Shanghai Pudong zone, which was a pioneer at attracting foreign 
capital. These zones played a crucial role in Chinese economy and made China a huge sweatshop for 
the West’s cheap goods and gave it an average annual growth of 10% (Mishra, 2006). 
 The character of Chinese export-oriented industrialization strategy was both urban centered, 
“zone” centered. State secretary Deng Xiaoping’s phrase “Let some people get rich first” (Deng, 1993) 
well described this reform intention. Urban incomes were raised and protected and urban 
infrastructure and services receive priority over rural. Resources and investments were first directed 
to urban areas to facilitate export. Where an urban-rural income difference existed and unable to close, 
it acted as a magnet to migrants from the rural areas. Abundant labor supply drove down labor cost 
and became China’s main comparative advantage in global competition. Further, cheap labor price also 
attracted a significant amount of FDI which focused on export-oriented industries. Eventually, in 2001, 
China’s accession to the WTO marked the complete integration of China into the world market and 
further aided the deepening of its export-oriented industrialization. 
 As for why the “Let some people get rich first” strategy and why rural China willingly takes some 
loss in order to support this strategy, a couple of welfare economics theories nicely explain the 
rationale behind it. 
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2.1.3.1. Some helpful welfare economics theories 
Generally speaking, welfare economics is a branch of economics that uses microeconomic 
techniques to evaluate economic well-being and social welfare in terms of economic activities of the 
individuals that comprise the theoretical society considered. Individuals, with associated economic 
activities, are the basic units for aggregating to social welfare, whether of a group, a community, or a 
society, and there is no “social welfare” apart from the “welfare” associated with its individual units 
(Weston & Townsend, 2011). 
Since welfare economics is a methodological approach on evaluation of policies, some basic 
concepts of it should be introduced in order to help on evaluating China’s reform policies. There are 
generally two theories presented: first, the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which helps on understanding the 
question of how to decide a reform should or should not be implemented and second, the North-Davis 
standard, which helps to decide who will support the reform and why. 
Even though welfare economics employs many criteria which are usually quantitative, they are of 
less concern for this paper. The focus is, by the help of some basic welfare concepts, to have a better 
understanding of the ideologies behind a reform, and, what matters when implementing and 
advancing a reform. 
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency: why let some people get rich first? 
How to decide whether or not to implement a new policy or reform? The answer is to do a cost-
benefit analysis to make a decision that brings improvement. Many of us would immediately think of 
the Pareto Efficiency theory which is usually referred to as the Pareto Optimal. An outcome is said to 
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be Pareto Optimal, if every benefits and no one is better off at somebody else’s cost. However, this 
criterion for efficiency is thought to impose a very strict standard, since there are very few transactions 
in the real world that will fit into it. Most exchanges or transactions involve external costs, which on 
most occasions impose substantial costs on society. By discussing the case of repealing the “Corn Law” 
in England, Kaldor (1939), in his article Welfare Propositions and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 
proposed to make some modifications to the Pareto Efficiency: 
In all cases, where a certain policy leads to an increase in physical productivity, and thus 
of aggregate real income, the economist’s case for the policy is quite unaffected by the 
question of the comparability of individual satisfactions; since in all such cases it is possible 
to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people better off 
without making anybody worse off …… There is no need for the economist to prove --- as 
indeed he never could prove ---that as a result of the adoption of a certain measure nobody 
in the community is going to suffer. In order to establish his case, it is quite sufficient for him 
to show that even if all those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, the 
rest of the community will still be better off than before. (p.33) 
This book’s publication represented the formation of the new welfare economics in the western 
world whose theoretical origins could be traced back to Pareto’s theory. In the late 19th century and 
the beginning of the 20th century, Pareto, Edgeworth, Fisher, and some other scholars proposed a new 
micro-analytical tool: Indifference Curve Analysis Method. Based on this method (Samuelson, 1947, 
ed. 1983), they established the Ordinal Marginal Effect Theory which states that the effectiveness of 
commodity can only be compared ordinally, but not be measured cardinally in terms of absolute price. 
Pareto analysed the use of these new tools and new value theories, and proposed a new standard to 
maximize the socio-economic welfare which is called the Pareto Optimization Principle.  
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New welfare economists generally share the same point of view that personal well-being cannot 
be measured using cardinal numbers but only be compared in ordinal order (Samuelson, 1947, ed. 
1983). But they share some disagreements to the Pareto Optimum Principle. The new welfare 
economics was later divided into two schools of thoughts: one is the school of “Compensation Principle” 
headed by Kaldor, Hicks and Scitorsky; the other is the school of “Social Welfare Function”, led by 
Bergson, Samuelson, which focused on the examination of fundamental social welfare standards and 
add some further supplemented (Samuelson, 1947, ed. 1983). The next couple of chapters will be a 
discussion on both schools. 
The school of “Compensation Principle” extended the criteria of Pareto Efficiency on measuring 
policy implementation. According to the Pareto Efficiency, an outcome is more efficient if at least one 
person is made better off and nobody is made worse off. It seems to be a reasonable way to determine 
whether or not an outcome improves economic efficiency. However, some believe that in practice, it 
is almost impossible to take any social action, such as a change in economic policy, without making at 
least one person worse off. Even voluntary exchanges may not be Pareto improving. Under ideal 
conditions, voluntary exchanges are considered to be beneficial to both parties since, unless mutually 
beneficial, individuals would not enter into such exchanges. However, a voluntary exchange does not 
meet the criteria of Pareto Efficiency when external costs (such as pollution that hurts a third party) 
exist, as they often do. With this respect, Kaldor proposed a new criteria which relaxed certain 
conditions of the original one. 
Kaldor believe a change that resulted in either a “Pareto improvement” or in “winners” from the 
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change compensating the “losers” to be acceptable. This is called The Kaldor Criterion. An outcome is 
considered more efficient if a Pareto optimal outcome can be reached by arranging some 
compensation from those that are made better off to those that are made worse off. In one word, if a 
plan could yield a benefit higher than its cost, it is a profitable plan (Kaldor, 1939). 
Hicks made some further adjustments to Kaldor Criterion. He think, when the “losers” could not 
afford to bribe the “winners” to prevent the change, then the change would also happen. This is called 
The Hicks Criterion. That is, the plan is implementable (Hicks, 1939). Hicks further brought in the 
analysis on uncertainty. He believes that as long as each measure of social and economic changes is 
able to improve efficiency and productivity, national income will be increased. After a sufficiently long 
time, the welfare of all members of society will improve, but the improvement speed will differ. Some 
fast, some slow, some go first, and some come later. But in the end, the losers will eventually get 
compensation. 
These two criterions became known as the “Kaldor-Hicks Criterion”, also referred to as “Kaldor-
Hicks Efficiency”. This measure of economic efficiency captures some of the intuitive appeal of the 
Pareto Efficiency, but has less stringent criteria and is hence applicable to more circumstances. Using 
the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, an outcome is more efficient if those that are made better off could in 
theory compensate those that are made worse off, so that a Pareto improvement results. For example, 
a voluntary exchange that creates pollution would be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if the buyers and 




The key difference between the Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency is the question of 
compensation. Kaldor-Hicks does not actually require compensation to be paid, merely that the 
possibility for compensation exists, and thus does not necessarily make each party better off (or 
neutral). Thus, under the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, a more efficient outcome can in fact leave some 
people worse off. While every Pareto improvement is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, most Kaldor-Hicks 
improvements are not Pareto improvements. This reflects the greater flexibility and applicability of the 
Kaldor-Hicks criteria relative to the Pareto criteria. 
Crucially, the compensation or bribe elements in a Kaldor-Hicks improvement are hypothetical: 
the change is considered an improvement if the assessed winners’ gain is greater than the assessed 
losers’ loss, regardless of whether the change when implemented would actually involve the payment 
of any compensation. It is this aspect of Kaldor-Hicks Criterion has triggered the most debate and 
earned significant criticism. For example, Ian Little (Jing, 2002) mentioned that the Kaldor-Hicks 
Criterion considers only economic efficiency rather than treat “efficiency” and “equity” equally. 
Regarding Hicks’s hypothetical compensation argument, Little said: “If a long time is a long time, then 
most of the people will not live [long enough to benefit from Pareto improvements] (Jing, 2002).” 
Bergson also agreed that the issue of income distribution should be taken into consideration. He 
thinks it is inappropriate that the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion puts efficiency over fairness. Following Bergson, 
Samuelson and some other scholars have further elaborated this argument and formed the thought 
of “social welfare function” (Samuelson, 1947, ed. 1983). They think that social welfare equals to the 
total sum of each individual’s welfare. Thus social welfare can be affected by variables like the amount 
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of commodities each social member purchased, each member’s productivity, as well as other related 
elements. It could be written in a multivariable function: W = F (Z1, Z2 ……), where “W” stands for social 
welfare; “Z1, Z2 ……”stands for a variety of factors affect the social welfare. Further, in their point of 
view, social welfare and income distribution is closely related. That is because even if production and 
exchange reach their optima, social welfare optimum still cannot be achieved without 
reasonable/equal distribution of income (Jing, 2002).  
In respect to the above mentioned some new welfare economics theories especially the Kaldor-
Hick Criteria, let us revisit the phrase “let some people get rich first”. Other than the beginning of the 
reform, China has been carrying out a reform that favors urban development over rural, and favors 
export over other industries. The thought was to boost economic growth to accumulate sufficient fund 
that later could be used to raise incomes for all. Yet the deficiency of this thought is a lack of proper 
policy or regulation on reasonable/equal distribution of incomes to ensure social welfare optimum to 
be actually reached. Nonetheless, China saw it is justified enough to carry out is urban centered export-
oriented industrialization strategy. 
The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion helped understand the rationale of why certain reform strategy is 
chosen. Whether or not a reform can fully be conducted depend on how many support it can get. Then, 
How social members decide to support a reform or not? Davis and North’s research offers a way to 
assess this question. 
North-Davis Standard: who will support a reform and why 
Two institutional economists, Davis and North, conducted a study of the sources of institutional 
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changes in American history. Using their own word, the goal of the authors was hoping this 
“intellectual journey through American economic history [is] . . . to provide a description of the 
processes that have produced the present structure of economic institutions.” They finally lay out a 
model where “the core logic of institutional change is neoclassical cost-benefit analysis and the 
motivating drive for institutional change is profit maximization (Davis & North, 1971).” They assume 
that intuitions and social members devote all effort towards profit maximization. Institutions analyze 
cost and benefit to determine whether new institutional arrangements should be carried out in order 
to yield better total outcomes (i.e. improvement of income, efficiency, or reduction of cost, externality 
etc.); individuals analyze cost and benefit to decide whether they should enter into any new agreement 
or take up any new action. That is to say, a new arrangement could only gain support if its expected 
benefit outweigh expected cost, or at least break even, for its supporter. 
Once decided to participate/support in a new arrangement, social members respond to the time 
and risk of expected returns differently due to their differences in education, cultural, and occupation 
etc. For example, a comparison of the different investment expectations of a banker and a farmer. The 
farmer, who sows seeds every spring and harvest every autumn, would like to see returns be sooner 
and secure. The farmer will likely to prefer a lower risk with fast return type of investment. He probably 
do not mind a small return as long as there is some return guaranteed. On the contrary, a banker would 
more likely prefer a large return for his investments. Supposedly, associated with this kind of 
investment, there will be higher risk and probably longer wait. Davis and North (1971) used the term 
“discount rate” to differentiate people with different investment expectations in regard of time, risk, 
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and amount. The farmer have a higher discount rate compare to the banker. 
In the bank system, discount rate means an interest rate that central bank charges when 
depository institutions borrow reserves from it. The interest rate is positive, because interest need to 
be paid to borrow money. In modern economics, discount rate gradually evolve into an important basic 
concept. With further taking “time” into consideration, it helps with evaluating a future economic 
activity. This “time” means comparing values of return between shorter or longer period. A dollar in 
the future, whether it is an income or loss, is not the same value as a dollar at present. Since during 
the period of present and future, many uncertainties might happen such as inflations, social changes 
etc. That makes the future value of today’s one dollar to be uncertain. The longer the time, the more 
uncertainty. What will happen in the future, win or lose, is not as important as what is winning or losing 
at present. To what degree it matters or matters not, is the “discount rate”. Back to the example of 
farmer and banker. The farmer wants his effort to be paid off soon so he could use the income to 
purchase next year’s seed and equipment. A fast and steady money circulation matters more to the 
farmer than the banker who, has much more spare capital on his dispose. Hence, in the long run, the 
expected return is “discounted” more for the farmer thus a higher discount rate for the farmer. 
A dollar in the future do not equal the value of a dollar at present. And the longer this present-
future interval, the higher discount rate which means the lower this dollar values in the future. Thus 
while making investment decisions, only calculating absolute value of returns is far from enough. For 
example, a statement such like, this 1 million dollars investment will bring a total return of 2 million 
dollars, does not at all justify the investment. If the collection of 2 million dollars return will have to 
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wait until, say, 50 years later, countless factors could influence the outcome to make the original 
investment unsuccessful. Further, there are also the opportunity cost of the investment that may be 
made elsewhere. For example, there is another option to deposit the 1 million dollars in bank at an 
interest rate of 3%. 50 years of interest earning will be 3.38 million. Comparing the returns, the original 
investment was not worthwhile making. The opportunity cost for capital investment is gains from 
saving them in bank. And the opportunity cost for work/labor investment is the value of products that 
could otherwise be produced. In an extreme case, where the banker does not matter at all for any risk 
and is willingly to wait as long as it takes for his desired return, the discount rate will be zero and there 
will be no opportunity cost.7 
The concept of discount rate in investment later was introduced in to a social scenario by some 
sociology scholars (Gruber, 2004), at where it is called social discount rate. With more social 
parameters bring into account, the basic idea is nonetheless the same. A higher social discount rate 
means people have low expectations toward future returns. For example, a nuclear power plant with 
a life span of 30 years. Although it involves a huge cost to clean up the site and disposal of nuclear 
waste at the end of its life span, because it is 30 years later, the estimated cost in the future, after 
“discounted” to fit into the current value, is considered acceptable.  
A high social discount rate is a signal of people losing confidence for the future. People thus are 
unwilling to take responsibilities and society suffers from deterioration of morality and lack of 
                                                             
7 For further analysis, please refer to Gruber (2004). “Chapter 8: Cost-Benefit Analysis” Public Finance and Public Policy, 
pp. 201-223. London: Worth Publishers. 
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credibility. Weak social or government function also lead to a high social discount rate since people 
are losing faith and have little positive expectation for what is to come next. 
The basic concept of discount rate is very useful in evaluating all kind of project implementation. 
Many social scientists have made efforts in identifying factors that determine the social discount rate. 
Possible factors including political and social stability, mortality rate, and average life expectancy, 
economic discount rate etc. (Gruber, 2004). Some scholars even have tried to estimate the value of the 
social discount rate.8  
So far, with all the terms used here: discount rate, opportunity cost, etc. It is not important to get 
into detail of how to calculate or quantify them, rather, they all serve the purpose of explaining who 
will support a reform and why. Now to summarize as below:  
1. The basic North-Davis standard: the members of a society evaluate a change of policy (or a new 
reform) base on the distribution of returns. Individuals evaluate their personal cost and benefit during 
involvement to decide if they will vote for or against a reform. 
2. The extension of North-Davis standard: the outcome of a reform is decided within a dynamic 
social level where almost countless variables exert their influences (variables such as social economic 
conditions, residents’ life expectancies, literacies, environment conditions, resources, etc.).  
3. The concept of discount rate: what will/might happen in the future is of less importance 
compare to current happening, and the importance keeps decreasing over time. Discount rate is a term 
                                                             
8 For more information, please refer to: Yuan, Liangqing. (2005). 社会贴现率的确定 Ascertain of social discount 
rate. Special zone Economy. 2005(07). 
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used to exam the speed of this decrease. The higher the rate, the faster the rate of decrease. Use again 
the farmer and banker’s example. A higher discount rate of the farmer than the banker means the 
farmer values a faster collection of investment returns since these returns will be “discounted” faster 
for him over time. Differences of the farmer and banker’s occupation and perhaps also their different 
educational and financial background decided their different investment needs and expectations. 
Any reform is a long and complex procedure that involves lots of uncertainties. Members from 
different social stratification react differently toward the same policies. Their expectations of collecting 
returns would also not fall into a same period. The general conclusion is: low-income social groups 
tend to have a higher social discount rate which means they are more inclined to receive returns faster 
hence tend to choose an arrangement that could yield returns accordingly. The high-income social 
groups, on the other hand, have lower social discount rate which means they concern more for an 
investment’s mid to long-term benefit thus they have expectations for higher returns over a longer 
period compare to the low-income groups.9 
In the real world, it is very likely a reform that suits the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, which enables 
productivity improvement and wealth accumulation, may not at the meantime be satisfactory to all. 
This is because it is almost impossible to fulfill every social member’s “Davis-North Standard” to make 
them all enjoy a net income increase from the reform at once. Some social members’ gains is 
accompanied with some social members’ loss thus created a certain level of inequality. Whether or 
not this reform can still be implemented will then depend on the game results between the social 
                                                             
9 For further in-depth researches, see Hicks (1939). 
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members who pro- or oppose it. 
In perfect democracy, the Majority Rule decides whether or not to pass a reform for 
implementation. A reform which conforms to the “Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency” might still be boycotted by 
the majority for not meeting their “Davis-North Standard”. This poses a point worth thinking: a 
program that may have a potential to greatly enhance productivity and social wealth may not be 
implemented because of the problem of benefit distribution --- the interest inconsistency of different 
interest groups (Gruber, 2004). To keep the majority social members satisfied is an important task that 
all leaderships face, under all circumstances, since people need to be constantly persuaded. For the 
government authority, the key to a reform’s advancement is not only realizing true enhancement of 
productivity and social wealth, but also establishing a solid and equal income/return distribution 
system so as to constantly keeping the majority’s interest and support. 
2.1.3.2. The validity of "letting some people get rich first" strategy 
China choses an urban centered export-oriented industrialization strategy which is to generate 
funds for industrialization through export at the support of rural area and rural population. At the 
threshold of its economic reform, China well recognized possible inequality problems incurred. Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous statement “Let some people get rich first”10 clearly indicated this. It is made clear 
that Deng was willing to adopt this, recall the Kaldor Criterion, “profitable” reform strategy. In believe 
that improvements in the general economy will benefit all participants in that economy eventually, 
                                                             
10 On October 23, 1985, while meeting with the U.S. business delegation, Deng Xiaoping for the first time said that: 
“[we] could allow some areas and some people get rich first to promote and help other areas, other people. And 




Deng’s statement: “a rising tide lifts all boats (Deng, 1993)” made a conclusion on the result of reform 
and suggested a possible compensation / allocation plan for later. 
While the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion helped understand the rationale behind China’s reform strategy, 
the Davis-North Standard help to bring some insights on analysing how China could generate its 
support from the majority population for reform implementation. The economic reforms started since 
1978 has helped lift millions of people out of poverty, bringing the poverty rate down from 53% of the 
population in 1981 to 8% by 2001 (World Bank, 2009). Government leadership believed that it is 
important to let workers and farmers to be re-initiated at producing more surplus and to tilt the 
economy back to balance. This idea suits the majority Chinese interest and every social group can 
benefit from it. 
The main points of China’s new economic development strategy include: management power 
decentralization on the state owned enterprise (SOE) sector, introduce market mechanisms to replace 
command allocation, abolish the commune system, restore material incentives in workplaces and 
encourage competition (Naughton, 2007). The start-up point is introducing market institutions to the 
rural areas. Policies mainly include downsize agriculture, eliminate prize control of agriculture products, 
and replace communes with the contract responsibilities system in agriculture, by which lands from 
People‘s Communes, though still owned collectively, can be cultivated privately. Farmers were able to 
keep the land’s output after paying a share to the state (Sandwip Kumar & Monica, 2013). This reform 
of agriculture immediately brought a significant improvement in agriculture production, increased the 
living standards of millions of farmers. The bottom-up approach of the reforms promoted by Deng, in 
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contrast to the top-down approach that China copied from the former Soviet Union, is considered an 
important factor contributing to the success of China’s economic transition (Sandwip Kumar & Monica, 
2013). As rural populations consists of the majority part of the total population11 , it help gained 
enormous support for carrying out further reforms from the society bottom-up. Earlier doubts about 
the reform were also eliminated and everyone was convinced by the good results from agriculture 
reform and believed in a promising prosperity future that would carry out by deepening the reform. 
The same methodology of in agriculture reform were also introduced in urban industry to 
increase productivity. Starting in 1979, a dual-price system was introduced, in which SOEs were 
allowed to sell any production above the plan quota allowing citizens to avoid the shortages of the 
Maoist era. Moreover, the adoption of industrial responsibility system in 1980 further promote the 
development of SOEs by allowing individuals or groups to manage the enterprise by contract (Sandwip 
Kumar & Monica, 2013). These reform measurements were no doubt successful. Chinese people were 
motivated and enthusiastic for further reform. Yet with the reform pushing forward, some of the 
consequences of China’s urban centered export-oriented industrialization strategy also began to show. 
Signs of imbalanced economic development started to show between rural and urban, whereas 
the rural and interior areas of China were far less developed. This is even a case that persists to today. 
Many factors can be the cause. For example, there are geographical challenges of some remote areas; 
                                                             
11 When the economic reform was initiated in 1978, the rural population was 790 million, account for 82% of the 
entire population. (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016) Economic reform lead to fast industrialization and 
urbanization of China. Even though the rural population decreased its share among the entire population, it still 
maintained a more than half (about 55%) percentage in 2015. (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016) There is 
no doubt that the rural votes means critical to any development policy’s implementation in China. 
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and there are different social, demographic and cultural structures of many interior areas often differ 
significantly from those of coastal China. What is more, comparing to urban, rural areas usually suffer 
more from infrastructure and information shortages. The above factors are all the natural districts that 
differentiate rural from urban. They do play certain parts on aiding to the rural-urban economic 
differences, yet this thesis argues that China’s urban centered export-oriented industrialization 
strategy played a dominant role on aiding to the economic imbalance across rural and urban regions. 
The next section will be reviewing the discussions regarding the export-oriented industrialization 
strategy.  
2.2. Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI) 
China has managed an average growth rate of 10% since it began economic reforms and opening 
in 1978. The Chinese economy abandoned its old planed system by transforming into a market 
economy. This had resulted in significant productivity growth and boosted the Chinese economy in a 
remarkable way. China adopted an export-oriented industrialization strategy that has explicitly 
depended on export to boost growth. Joining the WTO in 2001 allowed China a whole integration into 
the world system to fully capitalize on its large labor supply to play this strategy into its fullest. Next 
this section will start with a brief introduction of the EOI strategy and move into reviewing related 
debates. 
2.2.1. Origin of the Theory 
Export-oriented Industrialization (EOI), sometimes called export substitution industrialization, 
export-led industrialization or export-led growth, is a trade and economic policy aiming to speed up 
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the industrialization process of a country by exporting goods for which the nation has a comparative 
advantage (Palley T. I., 2011). Its characteristics include government support of export sectors by 
reducing tariff barriers, devaluation of national currency and so on.  
From the Great Depression to the years after World War II, under-developed and developing 
countries started to have economic difficulties. During this period, it was difficult for countries to resort 
growth or income earning need to export since many foreign markets were closed and not to mention 
the danger of trading and shipping in war-time waters. Regarding this situation, development 
strategies adopted by many under-developed and developing countries was called Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) strategy. Both Latin American and Asian countries used this strategy at first. 
However, the apparent failure of the ISI strategy12 consequently led to the strengthening of the case 
for the adoption of a more external looking industrialization strategy among these countries. Later 
many Asian countries, like China, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan (province of China), 
started focusing their development outward, resulting in an export-led growth strategy (Palley T. I., 
2011).  
EOI is a development strategy aimed at growing a country’s productive capacity by focusing on 
foreign markets. It started in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the emergence of a new international 
                                                             
12 The main critique about ISI strategy is that it requires government’s provision of tariff and quota protections which 
lead to productive inefficiency and rent seeking. Many articles and case studies have provided in-depth discussion about 
the ISI strategy. See for example:  
James, Dilmus D. (1982). "Structuralism, and Dependency in Latin America." Journal of Economic Issues, 16(3) p. 673-
689. 
Baer, Werner (1972), "Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations", Latin 
American Research Review vol. 7 (Spring): 95-122. 
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division of labor and production structure where large corporations from advanced economies start to 
relocate production overseas to the less developed countries in search of cheaper labor. This was 
especially true of the electrical and electronics industries that assembled in less developed countries 
like China and the products shipped back to home countries that are usually the advanced economies 
like the US. Korea and Taiwan, because of their strategic relationship to the U.S. during the Cold War, 
benefitted from this process and were able to gain access to technology through licensing and 
franchise without heavy dependence on foreign direct investments (FDI) (Lim, 2014). Some have 
pointed out that the success of the Asian countries, especially Taiwan and South Korea, have justified 
benefits of economic openness and globalization. And export-oriented growth should be considered 
the best strategy to promote development (Gibson & Ward, 1992). 
2.2.2. The controversy: virtues vs. limits 
EOI rose to prominence through the structural adjustment plan that was introduced by the World 
Bank and the IMF, and boosted by the performance of many LDCs (less developed countries) which 
adopted its policies during the 60s. The EOI hypothesis considers export as the main source of the 
government treasury and a major contributor of capital formation. Economists, especially going back 
to the classical authors, have considered exports as an engine of growth in the sense that it can 
contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources within countries as well as transmit growth across 
countries and regions (Lim, 2014).  
First, EOI is associated with the benefit of market openness. EOI means opening domestic markets 
to foreign competition in exchange for market access in other countries. According to Palley (2011), 
36 
 
the benefits of openness rest on a combination of three contentions as illustrated as in Figure 1. The 
first contention is based on the comparative advantage theory which analyze the gains from trade 
between economies with different capital-labor ratios. The second contention concerns the political 
economic benefits of openness for controlling rent seeking, a problem that import-substitution 
development was strongly criticized. The third, which developed later, is about the benefits of 
openness for growth. The claim is trade encourages technology diffusion and knowledge spillovers 
that contribute to faster productivity growth.  
 
Figure 1. Arguments supporting the new consensus on openness 
  (Palley T. I., 2011) 
Openness is also justified by neoclassical economists on the ground of allocative efficiency and 
economic growth. Balassa (1971) argued that export oriented policies stimulates sales. He also stated 
that comparative advantage leads to corresponding resource allocation which makes greater capacity 
utilization, permit the exploitation of economies of scale, generate technological improvement in 
response to foreign competition and contribute to increased employment in labor surplus countries. 
Exports have been associated with growth as well as the possible positive externalities for the 
domestic economy arising from participation in world markets. As Thirlwall (Thirlwall, 1994, quoted in 










Felipe, 2012) states: “the growth of exports plays a major part in the growth process by stimulating 
demand and encouraging savings and capital accumulation, and, because exports increase the supply 
potential of the economy, by raising the capacity to import”. The belief of that an EOI strategy will lead 
to development has become a central part of the free market economic doctrine in such a way that 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF and official government aid agencies 
have made producing for export (i.e. export promoting policies) a condition for providing loans or 
development aid. (Devi, 2014; Palley T. I., 2011)  
There is a significant amount of literature that provide valuable data for analyzing the EOI strategy, 
especially the importance of liberalized economic policies in the growth of the economy. Balassa (1971) 
and Michaely (1977) found that countries exporting a large share of their output seem to grow faster 
than others. Eliminating trade barriers will ensure a more efficient allocation of resources. Businesses 
can cut costs by importing the cheapest goods available. It also encourages foreign investors to bring 
in new technology and capital. Examples like technological spillovers and other externalities will 
benefit the economy as a whole. 
Another benefit of EOI strategy is that exports facilitate the exploitation of economies of scale. 
Classical theory believes that export as a development strategy enables development based on trade. 
A development strategy that promotes export encourages economies to open to international markets 
to capitalize on their comparative advantage to plan production more efficiently. Country can 
concentrate on the production of goods in which it has a comparative advantage based on its factor 
endowments. Resource allocation is also optimized. Thus, world trade allows the participating 
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countries, both producers and consumers, to benefit from lower prices, better quality products, more 
diverse supply of goods and higher growth.  
The product life cycle theory developed by Raymond Vernon (1966) has also attracted 
considerable attention. He analyzed in detail the process of how products enter the market and 
gradually disappear again. According to Vernon, each product has a certain life cycle that begins with 
its development and ends with its decline. The life span of a product and how fast it goes through the 
entire cycle depends on market demand, for instance, production costs, revenues and how marketing 
instruments are used. Many scholars have used the product life cycle theory as a basis for analyzing 
trade patterns. For example, Hill (2007) analyzed international trade patterns and suggested that early 
in a product’s life-cycle all the parts and labor associated with that product come from the area in 
which it was invented. After the product becomes adopted and used in the world markets, production 
gradually moves away from the point of origin. In some situations, the product becomes an item that 
is imported by its original country of invention.13 Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990) had also 
made similar observations in a joint study of them on North-South trade. 
Of the many studies on EOI, the majority focuses on the causal link between exports and output 
growth in developing nations. Michaely (1977) and Balassa (1971) agreed that export growth brings 
                                                             
13 A commonly used example of this is the invention, growth and production of the personal computer with respect to 
the United States. (Hill, 2007) In the new product stage, the product is produced and consumed in the U.S.; no export 
trade occurs. In the maturing product stage, mass-production techniques are developed and foreign demand (in 
developed countries) expands; the U.S. now exports the product to other developed countries. In the standardized 
product stage, production moves to developing countries, which then export the product to developed countries. 
This model demonstrates dynamic comparative advantage. The country that has the comparative advantage in the 
production of the product changes from the innovating (developed) country to the developing countries. 
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about overall economic growth. Love and Chandra (2005) confirmed the positive role of export-led 
growth in the development of the South Asia region. Mehrara and Firouzjaee (2011) also tested the 
EOI hypothesis by collecting data from 73 developing countries during the period 1970-2007. Some 
economist tested the strategy in different economies such as the UK, Canada, and the USA etc. and 
provided evidence to support the proposition that export enhances growth as well as productivity 
(Serletis , 1992; Awokuse, 2003). 
After carefully reviewing many articles based on various case studies from both the macro- and 
the micro- levels, Fu (2004) states that exports do not necessarily lead to growth. Rather, the 
transmission mechanisms are important. In general, growth of exports stimulates demand, encourages 
savings and capital accumulation, and strengthens on economy’s supply capacity by increasing its 
import capacity, thus contributing significantly to economic growth. Yet Fu (2004) finally remarks that 
cross-country studies cannot yet provide enough information on the exact transmission mechanisms. 
Only careful case studies can provide more compelling evidence. The most interesting economic 
scenarios suggest a bilateral or feedback relationship between growth and trade. (Yin, 2002; 
Papageorgiou, Choksi, & Michaely, 1990) They interact with each other. Growth in GDP facilitates 
growth in trade and vice versa. 
The EOI strategy has also received considerable debate (Palley T. I., 2003, 2011; Fu, 2004; Gibson 
& Ward, 1992; Lim, 2014; Love & Chandra, 2005; Papageorgiou, Choksi, & Michaely, 1990) which will 
be summarized below: First, EOI creates dependence on foreign markets. EOI strategy is highly 
dependent on foreign demand. To achieve export-oriented growth, a country has to cater to the size 
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and structure of demand in their most important export markets. The country is also highly dependent 
on gaining access to the designated export markets (Lim, 2014). For example, if a country plans to 
export a million TVs, this can only work if there is a demand for a million TVs somewhere in the world. 
Further, the governments of those foreign markets have to be free from steep importing taxes that can 
raise the price to a level that kills the domestic demand. This strategy can also lead to dependence on 
imports of key inputs (energy, raw materials, semi-manufactured goods, technology) directly or 
indirectly used for a country’s competitive exports. The degree of dependence may be higher if the 
country’s exports and imports are concentrated on a few markets and a few suppliers. 
Second, EOI creates neglection of domestic priorities. Since overseas demand and domestic needs 
won’t match exactly, the production capacity for export cannot be used to meet domestic needs (Love 
& Chandra, 2005). Countries export goods based on their comparative advantage and they import 
goods that would be more expensive (or impossible) to produce at home. An export-oriented strategy 
will make a country’s production focused on oversea demands, not their own. When overseas markets 
are steady and the money keeps flowing in, there will not be a problem, as the money can finance 
domestic development and pay for the imports that people do need. But the international market is a 
complex condition whose reliability depends on many variables. An incident like the global financial 
and macroeconomic crisis of 2008-2010, where most overseas markets were shrinking or even closed 
off, a country may be left with a production capacity that cannot be applied to domestic needs --- a 
million TVs with no one to export to. 
Third, EOI creates wage suppression. The comparative advantages for developing countries are 
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primarily their cheap labor, which lowers the cost of products they produce and makes a competitive 
price in the international market. For example, we can find a lot of T-shirts sold in North American 
stores that are made in countries such as Vietnam or China. This is not because Vietnamese or Chinese 
workers make better shirts than local workers, but because their pay is so much lower that it is cheaper 
for T-shirt companies to make shirts there and ship them to North America than it is to make shirts 
locally. Then, it is in the developing countries’ interest to keep labor costs low in order to sustain their 
export-oriented growth. Wage growth is restrained. People of the country will have difficulty enjoying 
the very prosperity that export-oriented growth is supposed to bring about. Palley (2003, 2011) further 
remarked that chasing minimum cost encourages a political dynamic, both within countries and across 
countries, that is aimed at lowering standards across every dimension, including work conditions and 
the environment. 
And fourth, limited opportunity and sustainability of EOI. Some economists (Fu, 2004; Palley T. I., 
2003) call export a zero-sum game. Every item that is exported by one country has to be imported by 
another. Growth will not happen if all use an export-oriented growth strategy because no one will be 
importing. Further, the export-oriented growth model was criticized for assuming countries can grow 
by relying on growth of demand in other countries (Gibson & Ward, 1992; Palley T. I., 2003, 2011; Yin, 
2002) which lead to global excess supply and deflation. Palley (2003) commented on this argument 
and state that:  
     In this connection, it is not exporting per se that is the problem, but rather making 
exports the focus of development. Countries will still need to export to pay for their imported 
capital and intermediate goods needs, but exporting should be organized so as to maximize 
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its contribution to domestic development and not viewed as an end in itself. (p.2) 
Export-oriented growth is also not a sustaining strategy. Wage suppression for securing cheap-
labor advantage in export markets contradict to economic growth to raise living standards, which 
means higher wages. This is especially true for those low-value added, low technology manufactured 
goods exporting countries. When competitions become who can provide cheaper labor, and because 
it is so easy for multinational corporations to shift production between countries, this create the 
problem of a global “race to the bottom”: 
Developing countries are trying to get competitive advantage through a combination of 
wage suppression; suppression of labor, environmental and social standards; suppression of 
business regulation; shifting of tax burdens onto labor income away from capital income; 
creation of extra-judicial export processing zones; and competitive devaluations that create 
financial instability. Since all do it, none gains significant competitive advantage. This 
destructive competitive dynamic undermines the development of standards, institutions, 
income equality, and wage growth that are needed for deeply rooted development. (Palley 
T. I., 2011, p.16) 
The above mentioned analysis made some economists (Palley T. I., 2003, 2011; Lim, 2014) view 
the export-oriented growth paradigm as questionable and tend to exhaust. On top of this, because 
export is deemed as a zero-sum game, there is argument that it is impossible to raise overall world 
growth with export as it merely changes each country’s growth composition. 
There are, however, also arguments against this allegation. He, Zhang, & Chang (2007) studied 
the growth pattern of China as well as other East Asian countries who have also adopted the export-
led growth model. They asserted that this allegation confuses the impact of foreign trade on the trend 
of an economic cycle and its long-term growth potential. In the long run, economic growth is driven 
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by technological progress rather than demand. When a country liberalizes its market and enters its 
products into the world market for competition, it will be forced to seek out and adopt the most 
efficient and cost effective production and management know-hows. This technology and knowledge 
spillover and other positive spillover effects that come with opening for trade are the major 
determinants of export expansion leading to growth. From this perspective, export-oriented growth 
strategy is not necessarily a zero-sum game. Rather, it has a positive-sum character. In theory, every 
economy can export some goods and services and import others, and use both exports and imports 
for upgrading and thus for productivity growth. Hence one country’s adoption of export-oriented 
growth strategy will not damage another’s interest. Everybody can participate and this is the essence 
of the export-led growth strategy. This is also regarded as the basic aspirations of Asia’s growth miracle. 
The success of export-oriented growth model should not be measured only by trade surplus or 
deficit. From a dynamic perspective, both imports and export can act as a vehicle for upgrading the 
economy and each other and thus to further living-standard improvement. (He, Zhang, & Chang, 2007) 
Exports not only contribute to growth in the export sector, but also bring about growth effects in the 
economy as a whole by enabling a more productive use of its resources through technology advance 
and economy of scale from exploring comparative advantage. (Benner , 2011) Imports could work as 
means of acquiring productivity-enhancing equipment, know-how, and foreign human capital etc. to 
achieve technology transfer. These mechanisms do not necessarily presume a surplus in trade. After 
all, it is important to maintain a strong and competitive exporting sector, but not that more is being 
exported than being imported. 
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Under the trend of globalization, to some extent, every economy is bound to gain revenue 
through exporting what they have comparative advantage and importing what cannot be produced in 
the country itself, e.g. due to a lack of capital or know-how. It is thus unwise to reject either export or 
import completely. The political and business leadership of the country should use the money earned 
from export to develop the economy to avoid possible over dependent on exports. This is also the way 
to bring up wages and living standards without cracking the economy. This requires delicate balancing 
of import and export. 
 In light of the not long ago global financial crisis as well as the obvious drawbacks of relying heavily 
on export sector for domestic growth, some measures were proposed for remedy to achieve a more 
balanced growth for overall development. Successful and sustained growth requires growth in both 
domestic demand and net exports. Economy formerly focused on export-oriented strategy should 
consciously make certain transition and shift some growth focus to domestic demand-led growth. To 
achieve this, countries need to restructure not only their distributive and redistributive regimes but 
also their production structure. Measures proposed by many (Devi, 2014; He, Zhang, & Chang, 2007; 
Fu, 2004; Lim, 2014; Palley T. I., 2003, 2006; Guo & N’Diaye, 2009) include: 
1. Upgrade a country’s comparative advantage by moving out of labor-intensive industries into higher 
value added industries, and make growth based on technological rather than wage competitiveness. 
2. Further export expansion by, for example, moving up the value-added chain, shifting the 




3. Recalibration of development policy. It is argued that reliance on domestic demand generates more 
sustained value addition than exports. Thus a shift of focus from export-led towards domestic demand 
led strategy should be explored penetrated for national goods. To make this happen, the solution is to 
raise domestic consumption much faster than has been the case so far.  
4. Rebalance growth toward private consumption. For example: revalue country’s currency, raise 
wages and improve income distribution. 
5. Government policies should target towards protecting and enhancing domestic consumer spending 
since appropriate growth in consumption means improvement of the population’s welfare. 
6. Develop sustainable domestic purchasing power. Since it is important to keep an adequate 
investment levels in order to grow and develop, when facing decline in export growth, by expanding 
domestic household consumption, growth rate can be kept unchanged. 
2.3. China’s urban centered export-oriented growth 
China had a nearly average of 10 percent GDP growth per annum since 1978. Millions of people 
have been lifted out of poverty and China has since embarked on a new journey with greater economic 
performance, higher productivity and growth than in the pre-reform period. Nevertheless, it is also 
recognized that China’s growth has been labor and resource intensive.14 In recent years, growth has 
also been associated with rising inequality (Benner , 2011; Devi, 2014; Fu, 2004; Guo & N’Diaye, 2009; 
He, Zhang, & Chang, 2007; Lim, 2014; Papageorgiou, Choksi, & Michaely, 1990; Kuijs & Wang, 2005; 
                                                             
14 For example, industries heavily draws on physical capital, energy, and natural resources. 
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Xu, 2011) with a widening rural-urban income divide, and ever aggregating demands on energy, water 
and other natural resources, the quality and sustainability of China’s EOI growth pattern was greatly 
questioned. 
2.3.1 The transition to an export-oriented economy has contributed to China’s economic leap 
Before economic reform and trade liberalization, China was a closed economy that had been 
pursuing a domestic import substitution strategy. During this era, China advocated “self-sustain and 
self-reliance” and focused on developing domestic production in replacement of most foreign import. 
(Xu, 2011) Through tariff and trade protection, some raw material industries and heavy industries have 
been developed. Exports, with their focus on agricultural products and mineral products, was designed 
to merely generate sufficient funds to meet basic import needs. This development strategy, though 
help to protect and develop some basic industry, was low in efficiency and productivity. Further, the 
whole economy’s operation is under administrative command. This disregarded the nature of the 
market and created price distortion and less efficient resource allocation. China was an economy with 
a low competitiveness, a shortage of fund, technological stagnation and weak national economic 
growth. 
China took up the experience of Japan as well as other Asian countries’ economic success after 
the Second World War and started its own economic reform in 1978 by pursing an export-oriented 
industrialization strategy. Due to its size, a large economy like China has great factor endowment and 
huge reservoirs of surplus labor. The reform period also coincided with the period when developed 
countries sought to transfer labor and resource-intensive industries to developing countries (Balassa, 
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1971). This provided a great opportunity for China’s development of labor-intensive industries and was 
a starting point of its EOI strategy. 
 The EOI strategy has brought China many important achievements. First, EOI brought economic 
growth. With the expansion of trade, China’s GDP has also experienced a leap-style growth. China’s 
total import and export in 1978 was only 20.6 billion US dollars. In 2014, total imports and exports 
reached 26.4 trillion US dollars. China’s GDP in 1978 was 218.5 billion US dollar and the figure in 2014 
turned to 10,483.40 billion US dollar. That is an increase of 47 times (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2016). There is no doubt that foreign trade has become an important driving force of China's 
economic growth. 
Second, EOI has promoted employment. Trade has changed the number and structure of 
employment in China. China mainly exports labor-intensive products such as electrical, mechanical, 
and textile products. The low labor costs give China considerable advantage in international 
competition thus earning China a huge share on these markets. Labor-intensive industries absorb a 
large amount of employment. Export trade has created 100 million jobs, accounting for 1/7 of total 
employment in China (Xu, 2011). 
Third, EOI has promoted the economies of scale. With export expansion, China’s international 
market share increased. Improved market capacity allows enterprises the opportunity to explore 
economies of scale. At present, China’s output of 172 kinds of products has been ranked first among 
others in the world. These include agricultural products, industrial products, electronic products and 
general consumer goods. Among them, the laser disc player, tractors and containers production 
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accounted for more than 80% of world output (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016). A large 
proportion of these are for export. Expansion of the export sector has not only allowed enterprises to 
achieve economies of scale both externally and internally, it has also been beneficial to related 
industries through demand. 
And fourth, EOI has promoted industrial upgrading and structural optimization. Development of 
trade has changed the ongoing protection of backward and inefficient sectors of the economy. 
Economic factors are prompted to flow into more efficient industries. Market demand has helped to 
sort out and eventually gradually eliminate traditional backward industries. New industries continue 
to emerge. Trade also promotes knowledge share and technological advance. China has changed from 
the traditional pattern of exporting mainly primary products. Industrial products become the main 
export products and high-tech products rising its share in export (Zhang & Zhong, 2009). 
2.3.2. Necessity for the transformation of China’s urban centered export-oriented economy 
There is no doubt that the transition to an export-oriented economy has contributed to China’s 
economic leap. Nevertheless, with the continuous expansion of China’s economic scale, this model has 
started to show many drawbacks which pose as obstacles to further the development of economy. 
They can be summarized as 5 points: 
First, resource and environmental bottlenecks. 
China’s large territory is blessed with a great resource endowment. However, even though China 
ranked third in the world for its general resource reserves in 2007, the per capita possession of 
resources is less than half of the world’s per capita possession where China only ranked fifty-third 
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(Zhang & Zhong, 2009). There has been a serious shortage of important resources such as oil and 
natural gas.15 China’s total oil consumption in 2007 was 349 million tons, 211 million tons of which 
were imported, which is a 60.6% dependence on import. Other energy or mineral resources also has 
limited or inadequate domestic supply capacity.16 
EOI growth tends to be an excessive plundering of nature, with very adverse consequences on 
the quality of life. China at present is a prime example.17 Resource exploitation and utilization as well 
as acceleration of industrialization and urbanization all have caused great environmental pollution 
including water pollution, air pollution, solid waste pollution etc. According to the World Bank (Xu, 
2011), China’s annual GDP loss due to environmental pollution has reached 10%.18 More than 70% of 
rivers and lakes in China are polluted to a various degree. More than 20% of the urban population lives 
in polluted air. Solid waste has multiplied (Zuo, 2007). There have been signs already that the speed of 
pollution exceeds the environmental capacity, which means the speed of environmental self-
purification cannot keep up with the speed of pollution. 
Environmental destruction and pollution in China is of course caused by many factors, but the EOI 
growth strategy shares a major part of the responsibility. The energy consumption and environmental 
pollution caused by the secondary industry is higher than those in the primary and tertiary industries. 
                                                             
15 The per capita possession of these resources is only about 7% of the world. Even the relative abundant coal 
reserves only account for 64% of the world’s per capita coal possession. (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016) 
16 According to the study of current reservation of 45 key strategic resources for industry by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2016), it is estimated that by 2020, China will have 9 kind of resources in serious shortages that will 
have an import dependencies over 70%. There are also 10 other kind of resources will have a 40% to 70% import 
dependency. 
17 Some other Asia countries, like Thailand, also shows the effect. (Zhang & Zhong, 2009) 
18 For example, China’s southeastern coast account for several of the world’s most serious acid rain pollution region. 
Pollutions like this account great cost when manifested into GDP amount. 
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Industrial products, which are both pollution-driven and high in energy-consumption, accounted for 
the vast majority of China’s exports. For example, in 2006 China exported 36.13 million tons of cement 
and 43.01 million tons of steel (Zhang & Zhong, 2009). The expansion of international trade both in 
volume and variety continually add on to the energy and resource tension.  
China’s overly emphasized on maintaining a low cost comparative advantage through mainly 
engaging in labor-intensive production that slowed down China’s industrial upgrading, scientific and 
technological progress, and reduce innovation. This has also affected China’s rational allocation of 
resources, and reduce the incentive to protect the environment. For example, China has less strict 
environmental regulations to promote industrialization by keeping the prices of energy, electricity, 
utilities (including water), and land low (Kuijs & Wang, 2005). In the province of Zhejiang, the 
government has subsidized coal usage for power generation. This has created cheap electricity and 
continues to encourage the establishment of electricity-intensive industries (Zuo, 2007). 
Second, increased international frictions. 
According to a press conference held by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOC) on April 8, 2013 
(China Briefing, 2013), trade probes targeting China are becoming more frequent and complicated, 
and resolving trade friction will be a long-term and challenging task for the country.19 “Increasing 
                                                             
19For example, in 2012, 21 countries initiated 77 trade remedy probes against China, involving US$27.7 billion in total. 
Furthermore, in the first quarter of this year, 12 countries have already launched 22 investigations relating to trade 
remedy measures against China, involving US$963.7 million in total. From 2002 to 2012, China was hit by 842 foreign 
trade remedy cases, including 621 anti-dumping cases, 61 anti-countervailing cases, 124 safeguard measure cases, and 
36 special safeguard measure cases. The amount of money involved has totaled US$73.6 billion. In addition, there have 
been 130 “Section 337 investigations” launched by the U.S. International Trade Commission, which are mainly related 
to claims over intellectual property rights. (China Briefing, 2013) 
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trade friction is an accompanying phenomenon as China has become the world’s second largest 
economic entity and a big trade country,” said Song Heping, an investigator at the Bureau of Fair Trade 
for Imports and Exports of the MOC. “The outlook for trade-remedy investigations targeting China is 
not optimistic as increased trade friction will likely become more normal, and exporters are facing a 
very complex trade environment” (China Briefing, 2013). The Global Financial Crisis has caused 
growing trade protectionism from its aftermath. While the global economy stagnated, China still 
maintained a relatively fast rate of growth amid sluggish global demand which making the country an 
easy target for trade protectionism (China Briefing, 2013). This also add to the escalating trade friction 
of Chinese trade. 
Third, diminishing comparative advantage. 
China’s labor costs can hardly be maintained at such a low level. The price of agricultural products, 
health care, education, and housing etc. contribute to the rising cost of labor. These prices have a long-
term upward trend which is bound to push up labor costs. Thus labor prices have a rigid upward 
tendency during economic development. Chinese economist Yang Li (Zhang & Zhong, 2009) believes 
that China’s demographic turning point will arrive in 2015 or so, followed by a continuous decline in 
population with a large proportion aging population. China’s labor force will shrink dramatically. 
China has taken advantage of its labor-intensive, mass production of economies of scale and fully 
exploited its huge competitive advantage in the international market. This is bound to have an impact 
on other economies with competing industries, resulting in the shrinking or even a complete threat to 
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the survival of their industries. 20  Meanwhile, China is also facing the ever fierce challenge and 
competition from many other developing countries such as India, Vietnam, Brazil, and Pakistan that 
are at the same stage of development as China and also focus on labor-intensive industries. This raises 
the problem of a global “race to the bottom” (Palley T. I., 2003, 2011). Further, China’s huge foreign 
exchange reserves are putting enormous pressure to appreciate on the Chinese Yuan which also adds 
up to diminishing cost competitiveness. An EOI strategy that is based on sacrificing the environment, 
resources as well as workers’ welfare is not sustainable and in urgent need to change. 
Fourth, domestic contradictions. 
There are three kinds of contradictions created by China’s urban centered EOI strategy that are 
summarized next: 
The first kind of contradiction is between labor and capital. Globalization, mainly the increase in 
world trade, allows capital to flow freely to places where wages are low, putting pressure on the 
bargaining power of labor both in the rich and poorer countries (Lim, 2014). China’s foreign trade 
mainly involves products in the lower-end of the product chain which have inferior in risk-shifting 
ability and inferior product pricing power. In order to maintain an advantage in international 
competition, the government pursues policies that repress labor and wages in order to attract foreign 
investments. On top of this, some local governments further suppress production costs by reducing 
necessary labor and equipment investment, and limit the social welfare input. There are many reports 
                                                             
20For more discussion, refer to the previous part’s discussion about EOI strategy’s “zero-sum” character as well as the 
discussion on EOI’s character of unsustainability. 
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regarding how workers are asked to work overtime in a poor working environment in order to catch 
up to the factories’ international orders (Zuo, 2007). And for considerations of economic growth, the 
introduction of foreign investment and other performance aspects, some local level governments tend 
to favor employers more than workers in disputes.21 This further reflects a weak implementation of 
labor laws and regulations which often damage the legitimate rights and interests of workers (Zhang 
& Zhong, 2009). 
The second kind of contradiction is between the export and non-export sides. In an export-
oriented economy, the export sector is the main beneficiary of export earnings. However, in order to 
protect the export-oriented economic development, labor and resource prices are kept artificially low, 
which is a burden on the environment and all of the people. Further, exchange rates are also kept 
artificially low which leads to higher import price. China rewards exporters with a high export tax 
rebate, while imported products are taxed relatively high. Domestic income growth is weak. People 
cannot enjoy the benefits of imports. This asymmetry of income and cost exacerbates the 
contradictions between domestic exporters and non-exporters. Further worth notice, tax rebates on 
export represent an outflow of national welfare. 
                                                             
21  See for example, a report on coal workers complaining employee for withholding wages and benefits. 
(http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/labor-08232016084403.html);  
Discussions the impact and solutions for discriminating regulations against migrant workers. 
(http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/49139/49143/3511484.html); 
Report on the EOI strategy implementation and the SOE laid-off workers. SOEs were given freedom to evaluate their 
employees and take corrective actions including dismissal of employees, while the social security system for laid off 





The third kind of contradiction is between urban and rural. Michael Lipton, who coined the theory 
“urban bias”, is probably one of the most famous researchers in analyzing the rationale of rural-urban 
differences’ formation and its consequences. In his book Why Poor People Stay Poor (Lipton, 1977), he 
argued that less developed countries tend to put development focus on urban over rural as rural is not 
usually deemed as having great potential for economic progress. Urban development and 
industrialization are usually funded by drawing resources from rural. This drawing process is backed by 
government policies such as taxation and public spending preferences. Government make economic 
policies and institutional arrangements in favor of urban. Public spending tend to concentrate on the 
development of urban areas and on industrial growth and resources tend to be allocated to towns and 
cities as opposed to villages. For one reason, it is because urban residents hold more political power 
over rural residents so that policy making are influenced in favor of urban interest. For another reason, 
it is historically a fact that industrialization tend to concentrate in urban areas since its many 
advantages over rural such as cities are the focal point of information, it has better communication, it 
is focus point of event and resources etc. 
Urban bias can very well be used to describe features of China’s urban-centered EOI strategy. The 
government direct policies to keep goods and services from rural areas (for example, food) 
underpriced and those from urban areas over-priced. Financing was channeled on favorable terms to 
investment in industry, particularly to large enterprises and/or SOEs. Public spending is 
disproportionately allocated to urban areas, particularly in health and education, while poor rural 
residents are disadvantaged in terms of education, health, nutrition, technology, and access to 
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financial services. Further, labor movements were restricted due to the Hukou system (Kuijs & Wang, 
2005) thus created income and welfare differences between rural and urban. 
Lipton (1977) summarized that urban bias will lead to a rural skill drain since the wage differences 
between urban and rural draws the manpower away. Further, urban bias stops possible formation of 
valuable rural-urban links. He suggests that successful pro-poor development would require a much 
larger share of resources for rural areas and farming. For the prospect of China, as it is rural population 
still consists the majority of its entire population, it is both not fair and efficient to have the towns and 
cities enjoy a far larger share of national resources.  
And fifth, over-dependency risks. 
China’s export dependency was 18% in 1998, and it rose to about 38% in 2007 (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2016). Some considerable part of Chinese industries are export-oriented. They 
are influenced by the international market. Thus. China’s smooth and high-speed growth largely 
depend on the stability of international markets and the global economic prosperity. Any fluctuations 
in the international market will quickly affect China. Such growth faces great potential risk due to very 
low household spending among people in China. Wages suppressed for export-oriented growth have 
suppressed the development of China’s domestic market, which cannot absorb the excessive goods 
that cannot be exported in the event of low export demand.  
There is also an argument that China’s existing strategy is fundamentally flawed, owing to its 
reliance on an export-oriented growth that is powered principally by a U.S. market which is fueled by 
debt. (Palley T. I., 2006) China has become the largest holder of US Treasury bonds. Whenever the 
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dollars depreciate, China’s foreign exchange value shrinks greatly. 
2.3.3. Transformation approach suggestions on China’s export-oriented economy 
An adjustment of export-oriented development strategy is imminent. But this does not mean to 
simply reverse back to the pre-reform import substitution strategy. The international market and 
international resources are still necessary for China’s economic development. Therefore, China must 
find a path that, while continuing to strengthen its exports by shifting from a comparative advantage 
to competitive advantage, raises domestic consumption power. This requires the focus of economic 
development to shift inward. 
The main objective of a country’s economic development should be to increase the welfare of its 
residents and to develop productivity, rather than only pursuing trade and GDP growth. A moderate 
level of protectionism is advocated (Xu, 2011). 
 Measures proposed can be summarized into three points: 
First, adjust income distribution, promote domestic consumption and expand domestic demand 
(Cao & Zhang, 2015; Chen & Wang, 2013). At present, the main reason for the lack of domestic 
consumption is the uneven distribution of income among domestic residents. Enterprises’ share of the 
distribution is too high. Income disparity among regions, between urban and rural residents is too 
large. Therefore, adjusting the distribution pattern is key to promoting growth in consumption in China. 
Residents’ income should increase gradually in proportion to the national income. Increase the 
disposable income of the residents, especially the low-income group. At the meantime, reduce the 
share of income of the state and enterprises. The distribution should focus on fairness and balance 
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income differences. It is also needed to establish an improved social security system for both urban 
and rural areas. These measures can all help increase domestic consumption and raise national welfare. 
Second, enhance economic self-development capacity by shifting comparative advantage to 
competitive advantage through technological upgrading and management innovation (Atinc, 2010; Fu, 
2004). Further focuses should be on improving the technological content of products and its added 
value. Scientific and technological innovation help optimize and upgrade industrial structure as well as 
bring internal economic development momentum. To stimulate enterprise technological innovation, 
there is need to reduce various institutional obstacles, to reduce the cost of technological innovation, 
and to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights. Piracy violations and counterfeit 
products should receive significant penalties in order to ensure a higher return for technological 
innovation. The government could use different standards, such as technical standards, environmental 
standards, and safety standards to measure competitiveness, and phase out incompetent products. 
Government should also increase investment in research as well as encourage private research and 
creation. Meanwhile, technological exchange and cooperation enterprises with domestic or 
international partners will also foster overall technological advancement, expand capacity and achieve 
a higher scale of production. 
And third, adjust trade structure to better serve domestic economic development (He, Zhang, & 
Chang, 2007). For example, when facing foreign capital, it is necessary to gradually raise technical 
barriers and environmental barriers to encourage the entry of high-tech and new industries. Promote 
balance of imports and exports by gradually expand the proportion of imports. Import of foreign high-
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Chapter 3. Data Analysis  
Nearly seventy years ago China started a planned development of its economy.22 It adopted the 
Soviet model of industrialization characterized by radical land reforms leading to collectivization. 
Whatever the merits, it has burdened the economy with costly defects, some inevitable in any planned 
economy, others unique to China. China’s productivity and growth potential was constrained and only 
delivered modest gains at best. In recognition of the government’s internal self-reflections over past 
experiences as well as the magnificent transition and economic success in neighboring East Asian 
countries (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Singapore), in 1978 China changed its path in favor of a “socialist 
market economy” which was characterized by a focus on de-collectivization and “open door” policy 
for foreign trade and investment (Deng, 1993). 
After the successful implementation of the household responsibility system in the rural area, the 
state further extended the market economic reform from agriculture to the whole economy by 
adopting an urban centered export-oriented industrialization strategy. This initiative was a great 
success in terms of generating substantial income and stimulating growth at a speed that filled the rest 
of the world with astonishment. Market mechanisms played a central role in increasing labor efficiency 
and resource allocation, both of which helped productivity surge tremendously. Yet wages were kept 
low due to a large supply of labor and national policies that were biased against rural and migrant 
                                                             
22 Also referred in different places as “centrally planned”, “soviet type” or “command” economies. 
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workers who worked in cities but were denied with equal payment and social and economic services. 
In 2002, after four decades of industrialization, the average hourly wage in China’s manufacturing 
industry was only 3% of that in the U.S. (Shi, 2012). 
In recent years China became increasingly exposed to external pressures like currency 
appreciation, trade protection, and internal pressures like inflation, income disparities, and 
environmental degradation. These pressures are closely related to some major drawbacks created by 
following an urban centered export-oriented industrialization strategy. China’s low domestic 
consumption power is a major problem since it makes China vulnerable to international market 
fluctuations because there is no strong domestic market to resort to at times of crisis such as the 2008 
world economy crash and the accompanying Great Recession. With a weak domestic consumption 
power and an over dependency on export, China is confronted with a troubling outlook of shortage in 
demand. 
The research of this thesis focuses on China’s urban-rural difference caused by the urban 
centered EOI strategy since its economic reforms in 1978. The purpose of this study is to exam 
whether China’s urban centered export-oriented economic reform strategy is the reason for current 
urban-rural income disparities which have led to a low consumer purchase power, shrinking 
domestic market as well as a dependency on international markets. This helps to answer the 
research question: what will be most likely development outcome if China continues to carry on its 
urban centered, export-oriented industrialization strategy? While my data is collected mainly from 
official sources such as the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), the United Nations, and 
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the World Bank database, and it is supplemented by data from some key studies as well as relevant 
news reports. Data collected for this thesis are dated from the year 1978 to 2014. 
3.1. The size of China’s rural population 
In order to find answers to the research question, it is necessary to provide definitions of rural 
and urban in the context of China. It is also important to look at the numbers of rural residents and 
rural rooted migrant workers since only a considerably large proportion of the rural population would 
have enough influence to affect the domestic purchase power. 
3.1.1. Rural and urban division 
The word “urban” is closely related to key words like: city, metropolitan, administration, and 
central, while the word “rural” is closely related to key words like: suburb, countryside, agriculture, 
remote. Then how to define urban and rural in terms of their geographical border? 
A city is a non-agricultural economic system that indulges its residents’ daily activities. Nearly any 
sizeable city contains an “urban core” and a continuous area of residential and industrial “suburbs”. All 
of these together make up the "city" as a unit of analysis. Such cities’ real borders often reach beyond 
its administrative boundaries. Many large cities in the developed world, due to highly developed traffic 
systems, usually consist of a wide range of suburbs. Suburban functions and the urban core are closely 
related. There are daily commuting from suburbs to the urban core through transportation links such 
as highways, railways, etc. The whole area forms an integrated “metropolitan area”. Tokyo, for example, 
is recognized as one of the world’s largest city. Tokyo here should be actually referred as the "Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area", not the administrative area of Tokyo. Its metropolitan area has a total population 
62 
 
of more than thirty million people (Chen J. , 2010). 




In general, many Chinese cities, or they should be actually referred as big “urban districts” (area 
A plus area B in Figure 2) to be more precise, normally cover a wide geographical area that consists of 
the city core (area B in Figure 2), which contains the highest density of infrastructures and economic 
activities, and the peripheral county area (area A in Figure 2), which contains mainly residential 
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communities. The peripheral county area often expand into surrounding towns or villages with a 
predominantly agricultural economy. The city core is characterized as urban while the peripheral 
county area is characterized as rural. As a result it is hard to draw a precise boundary between the 
rural and the urban as these area are most of time tangled both geographically and demographically, 
as indicated in Figure 2, most of the “urban statistical area” falls into area B with some small areas 
scattered around. The NBSC (2015) defined urban regions as areas that either have a population 
density of equal or more than 1500 person per square kilometer, or with a population density lower 
than 1500 person per square kilometer that contain either a city’s government body or county 
jurisdiction. This definition will be used in this thesis to statistically calculate the rural and urban 
population.  
3.1.2. Rural and urban population 
Table 1. Population and its composition (NBSC, 2015) 
Year Urban Rural 
 Number 
(million) 
Percentage % Number  
(million) 
Percentage % 
1949 57.65 10.64 484.02 89.36 
1978 172.45 17.92 790.14 82.08 
1990 301.95 26.41 841.38 73.59 
1995 351.74 29.04 869.47 70.96 
2000 459.06 36.22 808.37 63.78 
2005 562.12 42.99 745.44 57.01 
2010 669.78 49.95 671.13 50.05 
2011 690.79 51.27 656.56 48.73 
2012 711.82 52.57 642.22 47.43 
2013 731.11 53.73 629.61 46.27 




Table 2. Floating population in China (NBSC, 2015) 
Year  2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number 
(million) 
121 147 221 230 236 245 253 
 
Table 1 shows China’s population and its rural-urban composition in various years. In 2011, the 
urban population has reached 656.56 million and surpassed the rural population for the first time in 
Chinese history. The urban population has kept expanding since and signaled the great progress of 
urbanization in China. The main reason for the increase of the urban population can be attributed to 
rural to urban migration. According to the NBSC (2015), the major increase of population in urban 
statistical areas has resulted from migrant workers. They are categorized as the “floating population”. 
Table 2 shows the number of floating population over various years. By official definition, the floating 
type of residents, compared to permanent residence, are those who are in the area (mainly due to 
work) but do not live there permanently and have registered their “Hukou” elsewhere.  
Problems arise when combining Table 1 and Table 2. Even though the statistics in Table 1 shows 
an urban population turning point in 2011, if adjusted with the floating populations that are actually 
rural rooted (Table 2), the true urban population is brought down from 690.79 million to 460.79 million 
which compose of only 34.20% of total population instead of 51.27%. According to the NBSC23, in 2013 
the Hukou registered urban population compose of 35% of total population which matches with the 
                                                             
23 See for a number of report regarding the real and statistical difference on population calculation. For example: 
“Experts advise to recognize the pseudo-urbanization”. (http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/07-05/5010062.shtml);  




above calculation. Until 2014, the adjusted urban population only accounted for 36.27% of the entire 
population.  
As China continues its economic reforms by deepening its commitment to export-oriented 
industrialization, structural changes and shifts of labors between sectors have created confusion and 
difficulties on accurately defining rural and urban population. China had a large pool of surplus labor 
that occupied the low-productivity agricultural sector. Fast economic growth and industrialization 
drew them into the non-agricultural sectors, where employment increases rapidly. In the process, 
these migrant workers, though statistically counted as urban residents. Their real Hukou household 
registration and social welfare entitlements still remain rural based. 
 3.2. Economics of domestic consumption vs. exports in GDP growth 
Consumption, investment and trade are three component of GDP. They exist independently, but 
also interrelate and interact with each other. If domestic demand is weak, domestic supply of products 
may be exported, thus stimulating growth of export. Export growth will lead to equipment renewal 
and output growth of related industries, thereby expanding the scope of export related investment 
and consumption. Export also affects the structure of import since import need to satisfy related 
consumption and production needs. And vice versa, if international demand is not strong enough then 
it will causes a corresponding reduction in export related investment and consumption. Export 
commodities will need to turn to domestic market and hence there is the need to alter the production 
structure to make the products more suitable to satisfy domestic market. And of course, the structure 
of import will also change accordingly. In both scenario, whether there will be a GDP growth depends 
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on how these components interact. And these are influenced by international markets conditions and 
domestic policies. An overall assessment of the impact of exports on economic growth requires a 
comprehensive examination of the transmission mechanisms. 
In a dynamic point of view, the role of foreign trade is not merely to push up a few percentage 
points of GDP growth, but for the more important functions such as to achieve optimal allocation of 
resources, to transform and upgrade growth structural, to maintain international balance of payments 
and exchange rate, to introduce foreign advanced technology and modern management know-how, as 
well as to foster innovation and provide employment opportunities. 
Trade growth, especially export growth, has always been associated with GDP growth. It is not 
only because export itself can generate substantial income for an economy, but also the transmission 
mechanism that stimulate export related investment and consumption. This worth a careful re-
examination. In a scenario that an economy has large domestic demand that resorting only to domestic 
supply won’t completely satisfy. This economy is short of supply. Then an increase in import can 
supplement domestic supply and immediately translate into domestic consumption and investment, 
thereby boosting GDP growth. In this scenario, export, however, will reduce domestic supply and 
counteract with domestic consumption. Even if there is any increase in export, the increase will likely 
be lower than the increase of import. And increase of export will actually reduce trade surplus or even 
create deficit. This explains why sometimes an economy with a low or even negative net export still 
has a rising GDP growth rate. Similarly, when domestic supply is high and effective demand is 
insufficient, there is a relative excessiveness of products that seek foreign demand. In this case, net 
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exports reflect the net demand of foreign markets for domestic products. Trade volume tend to expand 
and export growth rate tends to be higher than that of import. Export growth will create trade surplus 
and bring up GDP growth. 
Export-oriented strategy had brought China rapid growth over the past few decades, yet it also 
increased China’s dependency on the highly uncertain global conditions and markets. This vulnerability 
was exposed by a hard way of the 2008 global financial and macroeconomic crisis and depression. 
There are suggestions that policy alterations should be made on turning the focus to domestic market 
for growth. 
Consumption also has an immediate impact on GDP which is also another component of it. When 
other conditions being equal, an increase in consumption raises GDP by the same amount. In addition, 
GDP is an important determinant of consumption as well. GDP growth means a higher income thus 
trigger a rise in consumption. And rising consumption in turn will boost GDP growth. A positive 
interactive mechanism between GDP and consumption has been created. 
 It is not merely a linear relationship between consumption and GDP growth, or between export 
and GDP growth. Nor it is merely a linear relationship between consumption and export. And solely 
concentrating on boosting any one component, either consumption or export, can hardly sustain the 
momentum of development forever, especially for a large developing country like China. 
3.3. China’s urban centered export oriented growth 
 3.3.1. Domestic consumption power is still not driver of growth 
GDP growth is often used as a major indicator to measure a country’s economic growth. Let C 
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stand for consumption, I stand for investment, G stand for government purchase of goods and services, 
and (X-M) stand for net export. Then: GDP= C+G+I+(X-M) 
To summarize, GDP is influenced by consumption (residential and government purchase), 
investment, and export.  



















2000 100.0 65.1 22.4 12.5  
2001 100.0 50.2 49.9 -0.1  
2002 100.0 43.9 48.5 7.6  
2003 100.0 35.8 63.2 1.0  
2004 100.0 39.5 54.5 6.0  
2005 100.0 37.9 39.0 23.1  
2006 100.0 40.0 43.9 16.1  
2007 100.0 39.2 42.7 18.1  
2008 100.0 43.5 47.5 9.0  
2009 100.0 45.4 95.2 -40.6  
2010 100.0 46.3 65.2 -11.5  
2011 100.0 62.8 45.4 -8.2  
2012 100.0 56.5 41.8 1.7  
2013 100.0 51.0 46.5 2.5  
2014 100.0 51.2 46.1 2.7  
*This table is calculated at current prices of each year 
The world average contribution rate of final consumption expenditure towards global economic 
growth remained at 71% -75% for the period of over 50 years from 1960 to 2014, and the overall 
                                                             
24 This thesis mainly uses data collected between year2000 to 2014 to support its argument. China’s entering 
WTO in 2001 signifies it’s complete integrate into the world system and a fully adoption urban-centered EOI strategy. 




consumption rate follows a slightly upward trend. (World Bank, 2016b, 2016c; UNESCAP, 2016) From 
Table 3, even though consumption constitute a large part of China’s GDP growth each year, its overall 
trend is decreasing and reached lowest 35.8% in 2003. From 2000 to 2014, there are 10 years within 
this 15 years’ interval that have consumption rates that are less than 50%. There are four years in the 
remaining five years have a consumption rate that is only a little bit over 50%. This is far lower than 
the world average. 
China’s average annual consumption growth is lower than its average annual GDP growth. 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2015) as well as the UNESCAP (2016), 
since 2000, China’s nominal GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10.37%, while consumption grew 
by only 8.13%. If bring price factor into consideration, the gap will look even bigger. Yet according to 
the experiences of most developed countries, consumption growth should synchronize or be slightly 
higher than GDP growth (Wang, 2006). In most cases, after a country’s economy reaches the middle 
income level, its consumption structure will change at an accelerating speed and its consumption rate 
will usually rise. Later consumption rate will stabilize at a relatively high level and become the major 
driving force of economic growth (Wang, 2006). 
In 2003, China reached the middle income level of the per capita GDP US$1000-3000 benchmark 
that set by the World Bank (2009). From Table 3, it can be observed that since then China’s 
consumption rate has stopped dropping and started to rise. This also falls into the Chenery’s model. 
According to Chenery’s multinational analysis on relationship between GDP and consumption 
(Chenery & Syrquin, 1975), household consumption changes in a dynamic distribution pattern at 
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different levels of GDP. For example, use the 1964 U.S. dollar purchase power as a benchmark, when 
per capita GDP was at a low level of less than US$100, household consumption is categorized as the 
basic need consumption type that mainly focus on life necessities such as food and residence. 
According to study, the consumption rate is very high with the highest reached 77.9% (Chenery & 
Syrquin, 1975). When per capita GDP rises to nearly US$1000, household consumption rate start to 
drop dramatically. Yet when per capita GDP passes the US$1000 threshold, the household 
consumption rate started to rise again. But this time, the structure of consumption turned more 
diverse and aimed to improve life quality thus involves consumptions on education, services, 
entertainment, and etc. In this perspective, China has great potential to develop its domestic 
consumption in the future as its economic growth progresses and reaches the high income level. 
3.3.2. Trade and China’s Economic Growth 
Trade has always been a great driving force of fast economic growth in China, though from Table 
3, it appears to have a less significant contribution toward growth compare to the other two factors. 
This is because the contribution of trade towards growth is merely measured by net export volume 
here, but the development of industries both vertically and horizontally that trade bring about is not 
showed. Development of trade sector helps increase employment, accelerates development of 
industries such as transportation and construction, and trigger investment flow. As a matter of fact, a 
major part of the Gross Capital Formation factor (Table 3) is trade oriented and also stimulated by 
trade. Many China’s coastal cities’ economy is largely dependent on trade. These kinds of stimulating 
effects that trade bring on national economy cannot be ignored. 
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Figure 3. Average Annual GDP Growth Rate of China (2005 US Dollars; % change per annum) 
(UNESCAP, 2016) 
 
It is well recognized that there is a positive correlation between foreign trade and economic 
growth and it is easy to explain this correlation as well. Since GDP= C+G+I+(X-M), when there is an 
increase in net export (X-M), there should be an increase in GDP. This can be seen in China’s growth 
pattern. For example, the year 2003 to 2007, China’s GDP growth rate raised from 10% to 14.2% (Figure 
3) and the export rate during that period (Table 3) also follow an upward trend. In 2008 and 2009, 
because of the Great Global Recession, China’s export rate has kept dropping which brought GDP 
growth rate down to 9.6% and 9.2% respectively. And in 2010 China’s GDP growth rate bounced back 
a little to 10.6% while its export rate also raised. Yet there were also periods that export rate and 
growth rate do no follow this pattern. During the period of 2010 to 2014, China’s GDP growth rate 
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puzzled many and had led to questions about how to evaluate the relationship of China’s foreign trade 
and economic growth. 
This can be analyzed using the macroeconomic aggregate supply and demand theory (Zhang X. , 
2003). When the economy is demand-constrained, that is, there is more domestic supply than demand, 
export tend to expand faster than import and the net export growth has a significant positive 
correlation with GDP growth. On the other hand, when the overall economy is supply-constrained, 
that is, there is more domestic demand than supply, import tend to expand faster than export. Net 
export has a less significant or even reverse impact on GDP growth. For the case of China, its fast 
economic development accumulated itself great amount of savings. Its domestic demand has a 
tendency to expand. This will gradually create a “supply-constrained” situation where export exert less 
and less effect on growth while demand for import increases. In this case, even there is still net export 
increase, economic growth tend to fall. Since it is not merely a linear relationship, it is then important 
to re-exam the relationship between GDP growth and its facilitating factors. Consumption, investment 
and trade exist independently, but also interrelate and interact with each other. For example, the 
previously mentioned impetus of import and export to consumption and investment. In order to 
achieve certain scale of export, there will be investment needs on infrastructure, equipment and etc. 
And many of such needs have to be met by a significant proportion of imports. According to Zhang 
(2003), 40% of China’s investment needs were transformed into consumer demands for imports this 
way. 
The development of foreign trade has played an important and irreplaceable role since China’s 
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reform and opening up. China accepted Ricardo’s doctrine of comparative advantage and enjoyed the 
gain from exchange and specialization through effectively exploit its cheap unskilled labor. Export 
became the driving force of China’s economic growth. To expand the scope, export further stimulated 
investment and consumption growth which through their combined effort pushed China to experience 
an impressive growth on GDP and national output (Palley T. I., 2011). Yet from the above discussion, it 
is clear that solely depend on export can hardly sustain the momentum of development forever, 
especially for a large developing country like China. Although export contributed significantly to China’s 
economic growth, it is just one of the factors. And although it was a relatively powerful factor during 
a certain period, this period won’t last forever. 
3.3.3. Sources of China’s urban-centered and export-oriented growth 
China’s great economic transition and its tremendous progress on export has been well 
recognized around the world. Since the reform and opening up, especially since the accession to the 
WTO, China has made remarkable achievements on economic development. Its total exports has fast 
catching up and eventually outrun many other developed countries. For example, China's total exports 
soared from $ 249.2 billion in year 2000 to $2.3427 trillion in year 2014. (Chinese Statistic Year Book, 
2015) Chinese exports in the proportion of total world exports rose from 3.9% in year 2000 to 12.2% 
in year 2014; in year 2004 and 2007, China’s total exports out run Japan and America; in year 2009, 
China surpassed Germany and became the world's biggest exporter. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015) 
China’s export sector is mainly fueled by a significant amount of industries that require a large 
labor supply. The most prominent amongst the finished products exported from China are electrical 
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goods, data processing technologies, foot wears, textiles, and optical and medical equipment. China 
also has the world's biggest new car market (Xu, 2011). China is also exporting a considerable amount 
of raw materials or primary products like steel, coal, oil, and so on. Lacking technological edge, China 
depends on wage-competitiveness to keep its booming export sector. Government issues policies that 
mainly favors urban industrialization. Wage level were intentionally kept down so that “Made in China” 
maintain its competitiveness in international market (Cao & Zhang, 2015).  
Figure 4. Average hourly compensation costs of manufacturing employees, selected economies 
and regions, 2002-2009 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Labor Comparisons. 
 




Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Labor Comparisons. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 presented an interesting observation on comparing China’s labor cost to 
some other economies. While China employs the most labor within its manufacture sector, its labor 
cost are among some of the lowest. After four decades of industrialization, average hourly wage in 
China’s manufacturing industry was only about 2-3% of that in the U.S. 





See from Figure 6, the divergence between productivity and wage growth was getting bigger and 
steeper year by year. Labor productivity has been growing faster than growth in wages. This means 
more of the productivity growth was going to capital rather than to labor.  
3.3.3.1. Urban-rural income disparity 
The great success of the export-oriented strategy has generated substantial fund for the entire 
nation’s further development, yet China’s income distribution has become increasingly unequal since 
reforms started in 1978. The Gini coefficient (a common measure of income inequality), a low 0.288 in 
1981, reached 0.388 in 1995, and reached highest 0.491 in 2008.25 Such dramatic change is highly 
unusual. It is obviously necessary to have a rethinking on the structure of distribution of incomes. 
Rural-urban differences in China have always constitute a large share of unequal income 
distribution.26 It is well rooted in the institutional legacies of socialism before the reform. Urban and 
rural residents are separated through a strictly enforced household registration (Hukou) system thus 
hindered the mobility of residents. Absent the need of job searching, urban workers were assigned to 
different work post for lifetime. Health care, housing, and pension benefits are also provided. In the 
rural area, residents also have access to basic health care and education. They worked collectively in 
the form of commune. The government set urban and industrial development as the main object of 
economic planning thus agricultural was no longer the focus of policy. On top of diminishing rural 
investment that was directed to subsidize rapid industrialization, the government, by keeping the price 
                                                             
25 See appendix 1. 
26 Changes in rural–urban inequality accounted for 47.4 percent of the increase in inequality between 1985 and 
1995, contributing more to inequality than interprovincial, intra-rural, or intra-urban inequality. (Atinc, 2010) 
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of agriculture products low, took a fraction of rural income to fuel the urban industrialization, leading 
to sharp differences in the living standards of urban and rural residents. All these add to the wage 
differences that urban income is 2.5 times higher than rural (Tian, 2010). 
Figure 7 showed the trend of China’s urban-rural income gap from 1978 to 2014. Since 1978, the 
reform started in the rural areas with the implementation of the contract responsibility system. Labor 
initiative that suppressed under the old system was quickly released, along with rural labor 
productivity. Income level of rural residents has increased substantially. The income gap between 
urban and rural residents narrowed. 
 
Figure 7. China’s urban - rural real income ratio (Lu & Zhu, 2015) 
 
 
As the reform moved forward, starting 1983, the narrowing gap of urban-rural income started to 
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widen again. Government policies’ focus of development shifted from rural to urban areas and from 
the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. Industrial development was faster than agriculture 
development and urban residents benefited from this significantly. Income of urban residents 
increased rapidly. Meanwhile, in the rural areas since the household contract responsibility system has 
been established, income level tend to stabilize and not moving up too fast. There is not too much 
room for the rural economy to make any further fast progress in a short term. Further, government’s 
support and investments toward agriculture were shifting away year by year. These all added up to the 
re-widening urban-rural income gap. 
Policies biased against the rural areas has kept causing the continuous widening of urban-rural 
gap and brought a “price scissor” effect on agriculture product, land, finance, and wage. There are four 
categories of “price scissor”. First, the “price scissor” on agriculture. On October 16th 1953, the CPC 
Political Bureau of Central Committee adopted the CPC Central Committee resolution on the planned 
purchase and supply of agriculture product. The State Council issued relevant orders and enforcement 
measures to mandatorily allow the state to purchase agriculture products (mainly grain) at a price that 
is lower than its actual value. And peasants were to purchase industrial products at prices that were 
higher than their actual value, hence the “price scissor” on agricultural products. Around 132 kind of 
agriculture products, for example, grains, eggs, pigs, tobacco, silk products etc., were not allowed for 
free trade, and could only be traded at a price set by the state at designated venue. According to some 
scholar’s calculation, from 1950 to 1978 (before the reform), 510 billion yuan, equal approximately to 
nowadays 49 trillion yuan, were taken this way from rural. And from 1979 to 1994 (since the reform 
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and opening up), an altogether of 1,500 billion yuan was extracted this way, equal to 93.75 billion yuan 
per year (Chen & Wang, 2013). 
Second, the “price scissor” on land, which means the state deprives the peasants’ proper rights 
of land through coercive administrative means during the process of land requisition. Peasants’ land 
interests cannot be fully compensated compare to if otherwise operated under the principle of market 
economy. China’s urbanization and industrialization process have improved urban residents’ living 
standard and wealth, but left the rural peasants behind. Some even believe that the rural areas and 
peasants are the victims of urbanization caused by land acquisition. (Shi, 2012) From 1978 to 2001, 
China moved fast forward with its urbanization process. The state has accumulated at least 2 trillion 
yuan of funds through “price scissor” policies on land. (Chen & Wang, 2013) 
Third, the “price scissor” on finance. On finance and investment, the state still implement a non-
balanced development strategy favoring the city. During the 90s, only 46% of rural savings financed 
the rural sector, while 54% of rural savings were channeled to urban. By the end of 2008, the balance 
of savings of rural residents was 5.25 trillion yuan, while loans from financial institutions to agriculture 
and township and village enterprises were 2.5 trillion yuan. The more than 60% of the national 
population only used up 6% of the country’s total loan. (Chen & Wang, 2013) Industrialization demands 
long term and continuing commitment of capital inflow. This determines the development of rural 
areas will be left behind for a long period of time. 
The dual financing pattern of rural and urban created many folds of disparities on, for example, 
education and welfare etc. Each every one of these disparities worth in-depth researches of their own. 
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Education services received by urban and rural residence are unequal. At present, the average number 
of years of education at the county level (including the county level) is 6.33 years for rural residents, 
while that of the urban residents is 8.68 years. Only 0.3% of the rural population have tertiary 
education, compare to 7.97% for urban. Among college students, 70% of them are from urban and 30% 
are from rural. This put such a contrast on 60% of the total population are rural originated and 40% 
are from urban. The high school completion rate of rural areas is 4.87% compare to 22.17% from urban 
areas. The population with illiteracy27 is as high as 64.1% in rural areas compare to 34.9% in urban 
areas. (NBSC, 2015) The current rural-urban difference in education hindered the speed of rural 
modernization, affected the rural ability to accept advanced agricultural technology and hindered the 
popularization of science and technology in rural areas. It added to the difficulties in transforming 
science and technology into practical productivity and eventually affect the growth of rural income 
and rural development. China’s social security and welfare system also differed between rural and 
urban. The urban social security system is more complete than rural. Compare to urban, rural social 
security system failed to provide social securities on, for example, unemployment, work related injury, 
maternity, and so on. On top of this, social insurance spending differs greatly for urban and rural as 
well. Urban per capita social security expenditure is much higher than rural. According to Chen (2013), 
urban per capita social security expenditure is more than 90 times in rural areas.  
Fourth, the “price scissor” on wage. Starting 1992 with the 12th National Congress’ further 
decision to extend market economy from the agricultural sector to the whole economy, China began 
                                                             




embracing an export-oriented development reform. Policies were directed to encourage private 
enterprises and foreign investments. China, with its vast size with abundant resources as well as cheap 
labor supply, attracted great amount of investments to flow in. The huge labor supply ensured China 
to exploit the comparative advantages on lower cost hence Chinese products were competitive in the 
international market. Entering the new millennium, China joined the WTO in 2001 represent a more 
thorough integration into the world system and made China play its comparative advantage to the full. 
Higher wage attracted migrants from the rural areas to the urban areas where hosts many rapid 
developing industries such like export processing and construction. Migrant workers left their home to 
the cities in seek of better earnings in order to support the elderly and young that were left behind. 
Their working income are the major source of the whole family. According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBSC, 2015), the total number of migrant workers in 2015 is 277.47 million, an increase of 
3.52 million over its previous year, which is an increase of 1.3%. Yet there is a large wage gap between 
migrant workers and urban workers due to their different education level, labor skills, and welfare 
background. From 2001 to 2005, the annual average wage of urban workers in China increased by 
69.3%, that is an average annual growth rate of 14.1%; while the annual average wage of migrant 
workers increased by only 19.5%, an average annual growth rate of 6.3% (Chen & Wang, 2013). By 
2008, the overall income level of urban worker is higher than rural worker annually by 31. 6%, monthly 
by 11. 9%, and hourly by 26. 2%.28 (Tian, 2010) The largest annual income gap between the two groups 
confirmed the urban workers enjoy better pay as well as welfare support than migrant workers. 
                                                             
28 Income include the sum of paid wage and social welfare. 
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Monthly wage gap is smaller compare to hourly wage gap. It shows that migrant workers are working 
longer time in order to obtain more income. 
3.3.3.2. China’s efforts to ease current problems 
China’s declining wage share was accompanied by fall in private consumption.29 This is because 
on the macroeconomic level, wages are not simply a cost factor, but it is also a source of aggregate 
demand. This in turn aid to China’s dependency on foreign market for earning income. In order to 
sustain growth despite stagnating or declining wage share in national income, China have to keep 
encouraging export to generate net export surplus to externalize and overcome the domestic demand 
shortage problem. Strategies that favor export-orientation in turn trigger the suppression of domestic 
wage. Yet the global market’s demand and financing patterns are unsustainable. When crisis like the 
2008 world economy crash and the accompanying Great Recession happen, a global demand shortness 
is an overarching structural condition that rendered the Chinese economy confronts a troubling 
outlook of significant demand shortage (Xu, 2011). 
In light of the consequences of the export-oriented growth strategy such as resource intensity 
and income inequality, as well as reflections on the global financial crisis, rural-urban disparities on 
wage has gained considerable attention and called for the need of policy alterations. Many Chinese 
provinces and cities started to raise their minimum wages.30 Government started to subsidize rural 
                                                             
29 See Table 1. 
30 See, for example, report on the wage adjustment in Guangdong and Shanghai in 2010 
(http://www.clb.org.hk/content/wages-and-employment); 




and agriculture by providing favored purchase prices, lower or even eliminate agriculture taxes, and 
invest in rural infrastructures etc. For example, there are the establishment of “Grain Fund” in 2004 in 
order to subsidize peasants who grow grains for a living; subsidies on purchase of agriculture 
machineries; subsidies on seed and fertilizer purchase etc.31 
These measure did bring about visible improvement on narrowing the urban-rural income gap. 
Because many policies that subsidizing agriculture are implemented since the year 2004, the widening 
speed of urban-rural income gap decelerated a lot compare to the previous years (Figure 7). And since 
2010, the gap reached its turning point and start to narrow again. Up until 2014, urban per capita real 
disposable income is 28,844 yuan, an increase of 9.0% compare to 2013; and rural per capita real 
disposable income is 9892 yuan, an increase of 11.2% compare to 2013. (NBSC, 2015) And the national 
income ratio of urban and rural now drops to 2.92: 1 (Figure 7). 
3.4. Further problems 
Only subsidizing agriculture and peasants is far from enough to bring a thorough close of the 
urban-rural gap in any foreseeable future. The measures themselves also tend to exhaust their means 
on further the cause. 
Wages have certainly increased over the last decade but so has the cost of living.32 Further, 
increase of minimum wage have slowed considerably since 2012 (Chen & Wang, 2013), and in 2016, 
Guangdong announced that it would freeze its minimum wage for the next two years. Current central 
                                                             
31 See related news report: China’s agriculture subsidy overview: http://www.tuliu.com/read-25500.html. 
32 See from the various years of China Statistic Year Book for price index comparison of major merchandises. 
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government policy was clearly stated by Vice Minister for Human Relations and Social Security, Xin 
Changxing in July 2016 that because: “Our advantage in labor costs is no longer as clear-cut as before; 
we should ease the frequency and scale of wage increases so as to preserve our competitive advantage.” 
(China Labour Bulletin, 2016) The pressing concerns lay not with how to subsidize those who were 
underpaid, but to alter the entire structure of urban centered export-oriented strategy that predicate 
on wage suppress. 
The urban-rural divide also appears in differentiated accessibilities to healthcare, education, 
cultural and social services. While urban residents who live in the cities have reasonable unfettered 
access to such services, rural residents will have to pay so much extra in order to travel and stay in the 
city that provides the services. Even though some smaller and medium-sized cities have begun to relax 
their administrative barriers to rural migration which made these cities a more viable option for 
migrant workers, there are no signs that major cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou will too 
(China Labour Bulletin, 2016). 
 According to Cao and Zhang’s model (2015), every one percent level increase of urbanization 
widens the urban and rural income gap by 0.3731 percent; and one percent level increase of 
industrialization widens the urban and rural income gap by 0.9152 percent. Industrialization and 
urbanization has been the core of China’s development strategy. As the process of urbanization 
continues and industrialization deepens, in a certain period of time, urban and rural income gap will 
continue to expand. That is because, first of all, industrialization will keep absorbing most of the 
investments and skilled workers. Second, the process of urbanization will continually pushing 
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resources and production factors to urban. Third, one character of urbanization is a continuing 
expanding urban boarder. Geographical constitution of where is urban and rural thus continuously 
changes. With urban expand its boarders, once was rural become urban, and once those who 
categorized as rural residents may be re-categorized as urban residents. These new urban areas are 
often more developed in itself and its residents often have a higher income levels than other more 
remote located rural areas. With the continuous extension of urban boarders, the rural high-income 
areas and population are continually stripped away, making the overall rural income level decrease, 
thus naturally lead to continued expansion of urban and rural income gap. Currently speaking, both 
urbanization and industrialization will likely continue their influence until entering a comparatively 
stable stage.  
The current development consequences are an interaction of political, economic and social forces 
that require careful evaluation. A strategy focus shift and structural change in the system itself will 
influence the bargaining power of labor versus capital over how income is distributed. After reviewing 
the data in the foregoing pages, we will now turn to the discussion and conclusion chapter on further 





Chapter 4. Discussion and Conclusion 
4.1. Summary of findings 
After the collapse of the USSR, Chinese leaders recognized that their models were neither lasting 
nor universal. The socialist model of a centrally planned economy would not work for China. Even 
though the adoption of the model has made the society more egalitarian and improved equal 
distribution, it was only a society where everyone became equally poor. China then turned to a market 
economic reform in 1978 which has dramatically changed its economy. At the meantime, as China has 
adopted a reform paradigm that focused on boosting growth through extracting resources from rural 
to fuel urban and export development, many problems emerged. Among which, the most significant 
one is an extremely weak domestic market to back up China’s huge production capacity when it is 
facing an international demand shortage. The 2008 global economic crisis and recession had rang a 
toll on the necessity to make imminent changes. 
4.1.1. The issue of inequality 
During the reform period, China’s fast rate of economic growth, which in most years reached, or 
almost reached, double digit levels, filled the rest of the world with astonishment. However, 
accompanying this, is the rising income inequality between rural and urban. This rooted in the policy 
focus of China’s urban centered export-oriented industrialization strategy. Inequality was believed to 
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be an acceptable and an unavoidable stage to achieve growth and reduce poverty. The notion is, with 
industrialization and growth, income inequality would initially rise and fall thereafter. Yet actually, after 
four decades of rapid growth and industrialization, the trickle-down effect did not happen. On the 
contrary, income inequality, though lowered initially and occasionally during the reform, has kept 
deepening its scope and painfully exposed China’s vulnerability to the recent global financial crisis. 
The income inequality in China is primarily driven by the rural-urban difference, which can be 
characterized as “urban bias”. Urban incomes are raised and protected and urban area receive priority 
over rural on public spending on infrastructure and service improvement. Further, it is argued that 
urban residents possess disproportionate political power and influence that further biased 
government policies to aid to their interest (Lipton, 1977). The high growth has not been shared 
equally by its entire population. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese economy is still predominantly rural. Ideally, 
policy targeting rural areas would bring a more sustainable development. Indeed, many initial 
measures of the reform in rural China resulted in rapid rural production and income increase. However, 
when later the reform eventually extended to the whole economy and policy focus shifted to urban 
areas, the large rural population was denied an equal share of benefit resulted in fast economic growth. 
Further, on top of diminishing rural investment, the government, by keeping the price of agriculture 
products low, took a fraction of rural income to fuel the urban industrialization. 
Rural-urban income difference attracted large migration of workers from rural to urban areas. 
They usually work longer compare to their local urban counterparts. Yet due to the household registry 
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Hukou system, they are restricted from enjoying equal local welfare. And they are met with lower 
wages and discriminating regulations on accessing social benefits. Migration, thought large in scale, 
only exist in the form of “floating” population. This drove down the labor cost and attracted export 
focusing FDIs which further aided to export-oriented industrialization. 
Inequality, both in terms of income distribution as well as unequal access to opportunities like 
education, health, and technology, has worsened for China, particularly the rural Chinese. It is now 
one of the most pressing problems for China, with serious political and social consequences. The urges 
to address this issue has never been so high since the growth process should not ignore any group of 
people, particularly of those who are disadvantaged. 
4.1.2. China’s export and growth 
Date early back to Adam Smith, export is argued to be able to positively affect growth. It finances 
import, attracts foreign investment, brings innovation and provide employments. Moreover, export is 
also very helpful on absorbing surplus resources, labor and productivity in the economy since trade 
will provide effective demand (Awokuse, 2003). Therefore exports help promote growth not only by 
generating income but also by its transmitting effect that reflected in imports, investment and labor 
input (Fu, 2004). 
In the years following the market reforms, dismantling the old planed system left China a 
substantial surplus of productivity capacity as well as labor supply. Further, these surpluses’ creation 
is also due to reasons such as, over-investment in export-oriented industry, policy and structural 
distortions, unequal share of income, consumption growth stagnation, etc. Export provided effective 
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demand not only for this surplus capacity, but also for China’s surplus labor (Fu, 2004). Hence export 
would be able to tremendously boosted economic growth. After high-speed growth over nearly four 
decades, China has emerged as the “world factory”. It became a major exporter in the world market 
in textiles, footwear, light engineering and so on. China is also exporting a considerable amount of raw 
materials or primary products like steel, coal, oil, and so on. Moreover, frequently with the help of 
multinationals from industrial countries through knowledge share and technological co-operations, 
China have also demonstrated its capability in high value-added areas of electronics, 
telecommunications and machinery (Yin, 2002). China’s export-oriented growth is driven heavily on 
foreign demand and investment with much of that investment concentrated in manufacturing thus 
contributed to tradable sector’s expansion. When an economy based its long-term growth perspective 
on the growth of export-oriented industrialization strategy that predicate on price competitiveness, it 
tend to issue policies to subsidize all input costs for export production. Exports and export related 
investments were promoted by significant cost advantages from the lower cost of energy, utilities 
(including water), capital (a substantial undervaluation of the exchange rate), land, and pollution by 
not having sufficient environmental laws and regulations as well as proper enforcement process. 
Incomes were channeled on favorable terms to invest in manufacture and further expanding the 
export industry instead of been passed back to people to stimulate consumption. Further, at the local 
level, production based value-added tax has given local official incentives to develop policies that favor 
industry over service sector (Chen & Wang, 2013). Service sector improvement is hindered from policy 
bias against private ownership. 
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The overall subsidization of input costs to continuing the path on export-oriented industrialization 
strategy is almost certainly unsustainable since it encourages non-economic and non-sustainable use 
of energy and resources. Environmental problems tend to intensify as well. Further, the national 
economy that is   is likely to face global fluctuations. Clearly the international economic conditions 
nowadays are very different from before when China just embarked on export-oriented growth. Back 
then it could heavily rely on the foreign market (particularly the U.S.) to provide demand for its exports. 
Yet in light of worldwide growth stagnation and demand shortage after the economic recession since 
2008, China will confront severe difficulties if it keeps relying on its international export market. 
The export-oriented industrialization strategy which relies overly on lower cost and cheap human 
capital input hindered the overall improvement of human capital of the society thus prevented further 
social development and stuck China in its current economic and technological stage. The desire to 
lower costs to improve export competitiveness discouraged domestic investments in human capital 
improvement such as education, health and general social welfare. Those worst affected are likely to 
be unskilled and low-skilled workers who had already been the disadvantaged groups of the society. 
They tend to be the first to get laid-off during any economic slowdown and/or at any time when 
enterprises decide to cut off redundancies for logistic optimization. It is also difficult to have them 
reemployed in a short period. And social welfare system is inadequate in providing proper support 
during such transition. Social instability and poverty will be easily created. Thus repressing investment 
on human capital can easily prevent the entire society from reaching higher level of development. 
Further, slowdown or even stagnant improvement on human capital will result in weak innovation 
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abilities for industries to upgrade. It seriously prevented appearance of high-tech industries thus stuck 
China in the lower value-added chain of supply. In order to keep its products’ competitiveness in the 
international market, China will then have to keep pounding on its domestic resources and depriving 
its worker of better welfare to lower the cost for export. A vicious circulation is created. China is in 
need of an imminent economic transformation. 
Export allowed China to access international markets and funds and this helped surging economic 
growth initially. But it is a more difficult task to sustain it. As also discussed in the previous chapter, 
pining a nation’s growth hope solely on export is unwise. Export should not be deems as the only 
source of growth. Nor is its only purpose to merely generate income. Export activities will always exist 
in an economy regardless whether it takes up an inward or outward development strategy, as export 
is an useful instrument that serves to promote technology advance and innovation, to vent extra 
production and labor capacity, and to improve competitiveness of domestic industries. The true 
evaluation criteria for success development should be measured by the well-being of a nation’s entire 
population instead of merely measured by the macroeconomic growth. 
As also mentioned in previous chapters, it is the transmitting mechanism among import-export 
trade, investment, and consumption rather than export itself that affect growth. For example, export 
revenues used for imports of capital-intensive goods that could not be produced domestically (due to 
lack of know-how or capital etc.) which made imports actively helping upgrading the economy in both 
the export and domestic sectors, thus furthering domestic living standard. At the meantime, domestic 
investment and consumption can also be stimulated accordingly. In this perspective, a healthy 
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economy depends on a healthy operation of all the factors in combine. China should shift its policy 
focus from exports-orientation to a more balanced development strategy. 
How dependent is an economy on export is determined by several factors including trade 
structure, trade policy, scale of economy, and the stage of economic development. For example, 
comparing to large and advanced economies, small and underdeveloped economies tend to have a 
higher dependency on export since it is under the pressure to earn sufficient income that could not be 
enough generated domestically. Further, small and underdeveloped economies are also more affected 
by shocks from external markets and external funds. 
Countries in different stages of economic development may also varies on their dependency on 
export. Countries in a lower stage of economic development and industrialization normally do not 
have extensive foreign economic relations thus they also tend to have a low export dependency. 
Countries in an intermediate stage of economic development and industrialization generally have 
heavy industries as focus of economy. This type of economy need large sum of raw materials and fuels 
that have to be imported mostly. In order to balance imports, scale of exports is also like to be 
expanded thus these countries tend to have a higher dependency on export compare to when it was 
in the lower stage. Countries in an advanced stage of economic development and industrialization 
generally focus their core competitiveness on technology advance and innovation. Industrial structure 
is technology-intensive and countries gain income through output of capital, technology and 
management know-hows. As a result, export dependency of these countries are moderate or low. 
China is currently in the intermediate stage of economic development that highly dependent on export 
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fueling its industrialization. In order to move up to the advanced stage of economic development and 
industrialization, China should shift its focus from export toward a more balanced innovation-driven 
development strategy by measures such as: move up the value-added chain by encouraging high-tech 
industries’ development, export of more sophisticated products, and bring in new industries to 
diversify exports etc. 
4.1.3. China’s consumption and growth  
Under neo-classical economics theories, wages are determined by marginal productivity, (Lim, 
2014) which means wage increase should generally be paralleled with labor productivity growth, 
though there may be occasional divergence. However, in China, wages have consistently lagged behind 
productivity growth most of the time due to national policies and/or global forces. Over the years, 
technology advancement and the global trend of removing political and economic barriers in trade 
and capital flow has put great pressures on labor bargaining power over income distribution both in 
the rich and poorer countries (Palley T. I., 2006). It was believed that globalization will bring income 
increase for labors of less developed countries. On the contrary, many less developed countries 
actually took up policies that repressed welfare and wages to reduce production cost in order to attract 
foreign investments. Because capital moves faster than labor, globalization has continually putting 
downward pressure on wages (Palley T. I., 2006). 
Over the past decades, because of globalization, an international production network, or 
sometimes termed as global supply chain (GSC), appeared where many countries participating in the 
production of a single product. Different countries occupy different stages of production according to 
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their own level of economic productivity development. Each country imports inputs to process and 
then export either as finished product or as intermediate goods for further value addition in another 
country. This process does not benefit all countries equally. Countries producing high value-add 
intermediate or finished products get the most benefit, while those who producing low value-add 
products using cheap labor benefit less. This of course affected each countries’ wage share and income 
distribution differently according where their occupation in the value-add chain (Lim, 2014). China, 
due to lack of technological edge, is at the lower end of the value-add chain that bases its 
competitiveness on lowering unit labor cost. The mostly affected were the rural population that 
account for more than 60% of the entire population. Thus there is only moderate consumption growth 
due to limited income increase of the majority of the population is under-paid. Domestic demand is 
suppressed which in turn made the economy automatically over-dependent on exports. Further, the 
dependence increased even more significantly after China’s entry to the WTO in 2001. 
In recent years, partly due to China’s one-child policy 33 , the supply of rural labor has been 
gradually diminishing. Hence work slightly to enhance labor’s barging power of wage. Further, 
government at both central and local level start to address the urban-rural difference issue by 
allocating considerable amount of funds into subsidizing rural and agriculture development; there are 
also related policies that aiming at subsidize agriculture activities. This helped narrowing the urban-
rural income gap to a certain extent and alleviated some domestic tensions (Tian, 2010). Yet these are 
far from enough to bring a thorough close on the urban-rural income gap to fundamentally increase 
                                                             
33 Since 2016, the Chinese government has abolished the one-child policy. Yet for its effect to really take place still 
requires significant amount of time. 
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the domestic consumption level and rebalance the social economic development. To fundamentally 
increase consumption level means a fundamental rise of income while mitigating the urban-rural 
income differences by focus on those who were disadvantaged in the past. Policies should include, for 
example, better accessibility to public health care for the poorer, universal accessibility to education 
services, more fiscal revenue devoted to the provision of public goods rather than to reinvest, 
mitigating domestic inflation and real-estate prices to lift constraint on consumption, and continuing 
support and investment in rural development. 
For the improvement of China’s export sector, it can continually optimizing its export production 
structure by moving up the value-add chain through developing industries that are more 
environmentally sustainable, energy efficient, and high technology. But at the same time, China have 
to reduce its dependency on foreign market by reducing the need for gaining more market share; and 
redirect certain productive capacity to serve internal market. This means a restructure of tradable 
sectors as well as building new productive capacity in sectors that serve local consumers (Palley T. I., 
2011; Lim, 2014). 
China need to rebalance its economy by shifting focus from an export-oriented growth to a new 
paradigm of domestic demand-oriented growth that characterized by focusing on building a healthier 
rural economic environment for the rural residence. Wage suppression for securing cheap labor 
advantage in export markets contradict to economic growth to raise living standards, which means 
higher wages and higher domestic consumption. Under export-oriented growth, higher wages 
undermine growth. Under domestic demand-oriented growth, they support it. 
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4.2. What remains in question 
This thesis focuses on examining China’s urban centered export-oriented industrialization strategy 
and its consequence of weak domestic market demand caused by the asymmetric urban-rural income 
allocation. A few related points can be extracted for other related research. 
Firstly, there is a significant difference between export as part of growth and export-oriented 
growth. For any open economy, export is a necessary part of growth to earn foreign exchange to import 
goods and services. However, when a country takes up export-oriented growth strategy, it deems 
export as a driver of growth. It explicitly builds its industrial and/or trade policy to promote exports. 
Such policies include, for example, repressing wages and curtailing welfare 34  to keep costs low, 
designing monetary and tax policies encourage businesses to export, as in China. Export-oriented 
strategy tend to lead to inadequate domestic welfare, and stagnation of human capital improvement. 
Competitive advantages based on lowering the cost mainly benefited foreign consumers who get to 
purchase goods at a lower price at the expense of domestic consumers. At the meantime, domestic 
consumers are also facing higher price of import goods and services (Lim, 2014). It is thus worthwhile 
for future researches to exam the extent to when does export as part of growth start to transform into 
export-oriented growth. 
                                                             
34 For example, China prohibit voluntary trade unions. The only legally mandated trade union, the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has a titular presence in many workplaces. The union representatives are largely under the 
sway of management and have no real connection to ordinary workers. Trade union officials currently have neither the 
will nor the ability to effectively represent their members in wage negotiations with management. In many cases, they 




Secondly, while the sustainability of China’s current growth patterns has caused concerns from a 
domestic perspective, there exists an even larger issue from the perspective of the whole world 
economy where many other developing countries who may also pursuing the same strategy. Palley 
(2003) used the phrase “crow-out” to describe what would happen when a group of countries all based 
their economic growth on expanding exports to industrialized countries. Due to limited international 
demand growth, competition will be getting ever fierce. It narrows the maneuvering room of 
latecomers and exerts a certain “crowding-out effect” (Palley T. I., 2003). Those who want to keep going 
has to compete with each other on who can offer the cheapest price. This eventually become a 
destructive competition on wage, environment and social standards suppression that undermines 
development of standards, institutions, and wage growth. This certainly has its implications for both 
China and countries attempting to follow China’s pattern of development and worth further research 
attention. 
Thirdly, the fast progress of urbanization presented potential opportunities to further growth. The 
speed of urbanization in China is tremendous thanks to migration from the countryside that expanded 
the urban population. Even though rural population still consist of the majority of the population, 
judging from the increasing speed of urban population growth, it is reasonable to assume the urban 
population would exceed that of rural in the near future. Further, judging from the development 
patterns of other countries, urbanization is happening around the world and is inevitable due to 
technological advances and population increase. The convenience of goods and services is one of the 
benefits of urbanization. Urbanization process allow increased literacy and better health since cities 
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provide easier and better access to advanced educational and medical services. There is possibilities 
of better social integration in urbanized areas. People of different religions, ethnic backgrounds, social 
classes and races reside in the same area. This leads to more understanding and acceptance of 
differences. On the other hand, it should be also taken into consideration some potential problems 
related to urbanization such as pollution, growing unemployment due to intensified competition and 
so on (Henderson, 2009). International experience demonstrates that cities are the focal point of 
technology, information and services. The rapid urbanization provide China with enormous 
opportunities to maintain high growth through various potentials. For example, increased domestic 
demand compare to export demand as median or small sized cities accelerate their growth; better 
efficiency in investment as well as utilizing existing resources; and technology advance that could aid 
to growth of high value-add manufacturing and services. The key is to substantially reform urban 
policies and institutions while further integrate the urban and rural sectors to achieve harmony. 
Another point worth noticing is the demographic reality of China. China’s 2010 census 
documented some profound demographic changes. The new census data confirmed and revealed that 
China has entered a new demographic era, featured by prolonged low fertility, rapid aging, massive 
urbanization and major geographic redistribution (Cai, 2013). These new changes corresponded with 
China’s economic prosperity as well as increasing inequality. Under a broader context of ever fierce 
global competition, there changes certainly would have profound effect on China’s future direction of 
economic development as well as the world social and economic development. Among all the 
challenges, fertility decline is the cause of all other challenges such as rapid aging and labor shortages. 
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With the shrinking of working population and the expanding number of elderly Chinese, China need 
to seek out alternative growth patterns for more sustained development since labor cost is almost 
certain to increase, not to mention associated increase of social cost (Cai, 2013). The elimination of 
“one child policy” in 2016 signals one of the steps that China respond to these demographic challenges. 
Further research on this subject will definitely be valuable. 
Last but not least, the question “what will be an appropriate development model for China” has 
been among the most frequently asked questions. As still a developing country, China remains in the 
relatively low level of economic and social development and facing with many difficulties and 
challenges in the realization of poverty reduction and common prosperity. Of course the government 
is taking various measures trying to resolve them. And China has made great progress on catching-up 
and establishing a strong industrial economy over four-decade reform development. During this time, 
China has also made many breakthroughs in exploring its own development paradigm. At present, 
China seems to be moving in multiple directions at the same time, with no discernible pattern. That is, 
China is still in search for a development model, based on the concept of balancing growth distribution 
to achieve better social development. The findings of this thesis confirm that the urban centered EOI 
strategy indeed alleviated poverty to certain extend and has also helped resolve a series of social 
problems and contributed to some social improvement as well. However, in order to sustain economic 
growth and achieve more balanced social development, it is necessary for the government start 
shifting focuses and introducing new measure of reforms that would fundamentally change the 
productive and distributive structures of the market and society. Time should be devoted to study what 
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development model it will be in the end. 
This thesis does not try to generalize the findings, nor does it try to extrapolate future implications. 
This thesis only serves to explain the major problem created by China’s current development focus 
which is the domestic demand shortage caused by urban-rural distribution differences. The finding is 
that current pattern of development that served its purpose in the past has become unfit for 
addressing further growth and social development need. Even so, the scope of the paper presented is 
limited and more research must be done to study China’s development strategies.  
4.3. Conclusion 
Inequality has been rising since China’s economic reform. This thesis emphasis on analyzing 
inequality in terms of urban-rural income differences that induced by the combination work of global 
forces and national policies particularly the urban centered export-oriented growth model pursued by 
China. 
Since the market reform, the impressive growth rate has accompanied by increasing inequality 
and declining wage share of national income. This is because both global forces and government 
policies put a downward pressure on labor’s bargaining power of income. It resulted wage rising slower 
than productivity. Since China is on the intermediate development stage and occupying the lower 
position on the global supply chain, it pursed an export-oriented industrialization growth model based 
on inviting foreign direct investments into labor-intensive industries. This means wages need to be 
always repressed in order for China to maintain its international competitiveness. Thus many policies 
are issued in this regard. Labor activities are repressed, social welfare declined. Since the majority 
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labor supply of China are migrant rural worker whose share of income and welfare were the mostly 
undermined, declining wage share leads to falling private consumption and aggregate demand.  
China was also overly dependent on international market for its exports thus made it more 
vulnerable to external conditions. After the recent global financial crisis, the current shape of 
international economic environment does not resemble its past. China’s export-oriented growth is 
facing declining global demand and ever intense competition from other competitors. The ever 
growing of social and environmental cost has also made it more difficult to sustain an export-oriented 
strategy that predicate on cost. It is unlikely that China can continuously depending on exports as the 
main driver of growth. 
The urban-centered policy focus has created severe imbalance. The majority rural population did 
not have an equal share, compared to the urban population, of income, accessibility to health, 
education, culture and social services and etc. This is certainly will not sustain and eventually 
undermine the whole society’s welfare improvement. For the purpose of both seeking new source of 
growth as well as to achieve a more balanced growth, China should turn from international market to 
domestic market demand. 
To achieve this, first, China need to restructure its production structure. Since oversea demands 
and domestic needs won’t match exactly, the production capacity for export cannot be used to meet 
domestic needs. Second, China also need to restructure its distributive and redistributive regimes. 
Wage growth should keep up with productivity growth in order to rebalance the labor and capital share 
of GDP. This will make sure more gains could be used to fuel domestic consumption instead of captured 
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by capital in the form of higher profits or by external consumers in the form of lower prices. Thirds, 
increasing wage share for the majority population by focusing on building a healthier rural economic 
environment for the rural residence. Government and private reinvestment should focus on rural 
development while avoiding over investment on the export sector. Government policies should also 






Appendix 1. Urban and rural income inequality, 1978–2011(Gini coefficients) 
Year Rural  Urban National National with 
adjustment 
1978 0.212 0.16 n.a. n.a. 
1979 0.237 0.16 n.a. n.a. 
1980 0.238 0.16 n.a. n.a. 
1981 0.239 0.15 0.310  0.280  
1982 0.232 0.15 0.285  0.259  
1983 0.246 0.15 0.283  0.260  
1984 0.258 0.16 0.291  0.269  
1985 0.264 0.19 0.290  0.265  
1986 0.288 0.19 0.324  0.292  
1987 0.292 0.20 0.324  0.289  
1988 0.301 0.23 0.330  0.295  
1989 0.300 0.23 0.352  0.318  
1990 0.31 0.23 0.349  0.316  
1991 0.307 0.24 0.371  0.331  
1992 0.313 0.25 0.390  0.342  
1993 0.329 0.27 0.420  0.367  
1994 0.321 0.30 0.433  0.376  
1995 0.342 0.28 0.415  0.365  
1996 0.323 0.28 0.398  0.351  
1997 0.329 0.29 0.398  0.350  
1998 0.337 0.30 0.403  0.354  
1999 0.336 0.30 0.416  0.364  
2000 0.354 0.32 0.438  0.385  
2001 0.36 0.32 0.447  0.395  
2002 0.365 0.32 0.450 n.a. 
2003 0.368 0.33 0.479  n.a. 
2004 0.37 0.33 0.473  n.a. 
2005 0.38 0.34 0.485  n.a. 
2006 0.37 0.34 0.487  n.a. 
2007 0.37 0.34 0.484  n.a. 
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2008 0.38 0.34 0.491  n.a. 
2009 0.39 0.34 0.49  n.a. 
2010 0.38 0.33 0.481  n.a. 
2011 0.37 n.a 0.477  n.a. 
2012 n.a n.a 0.474  n.a. 
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